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INTRODUCTION

"All I maintain is that on this earth there are pestilences and there are victims, and it's up to us, so far as
possible, not to join forces with the pestilences."Albert Camus, The PlagueT he Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), and fear
of exposure to the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV),
which causes AIDS, has induced a tremendous fear in modern society. This fear is understandable: AIDS has no cure, it is inevitably fatal and it suggests membership in a group that presently
includes mostly unpopular minorities.' By the middle of 1988,
over 70,000 cases of AIDS had been reported in the United
States. 2 By the end of 1992, 365,000 cases are projected;3 and by
1993, 450,000. 4 Those infected with HIV are estimated at be-

tween 940,000 and 1,500,000, with a substantial increase in that
level of infection expected in the next few years. 5 The time from
I. Since 1981, when epidemiologic reporting on the incidence of AIDS first
began, 63% of the victims have been homosexual or bisexual men with no history of IV drug abuse; 7% homosexual or bisexual men with a history of drug
abuse; 19%, heterosexual men and women who used IV drugs; 3% of the cases
have been due to transfusions with contaminated blood; and 3% of the cases
have been of undetermined origin. Heyward & Curran, The Epideniiology of AIDS
in the C.S., 259 Sci. AM. 72, 78 (1988). As ofJuly 4, 1988, homosexual or bisexual men and IV drug abusers made up 89% of the adult cases. Id.
2. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV.,
Quarterlv Report to the Domestic Policy Council on the Prevalence and Rate of Spread of
HilI'andAIDS-United States, 37 MORBIDIT' & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 551, 552
(1988).
3. Id.
4. Ginzburg, 1111 Related Diseases and the Future of the Delivery of Psychiatric
Care, 18 PSYCHIATRiC ANNALS 563, 567 (1988).
5. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTI! & HUMAN SERV.,
Vumber of Sex Partners and Potential Risks of Sexiual Exposure to Human IiiniunodeficiencO
Virus, 37 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 565 (1988) (number of Americans at risk because of unprotected sexual exposures unknown).
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a person's initial infection with HIV to diagnosis with AIDS appears now to be over eight years." Once diagnosed, however, a
person with AIDS generally has less than eighteen months to live,
although this survival time depends on how one views the stages
of progression of the disease. 7 Studies of the treatment benefits
of Zidovudine (AZT) show that its use can extend that period
somewhat, 8 but there is currently no cure. ) The only medical intervention is to treat the infections associated with the HIV
virus. 10

Unlike powerful disease vectors in past plagues, the AIDS virus isn't easily transmitted; rather, it is only mildly contagious,
requiring the exchange of a volume of bodily fluids, such as blood
or sperm, to convey the virus. 1 ' However, health care profession6. Ginzburg, supra note 4, at 567.
7. Redfield & Burke, HIV Infection: The Clinical Picture, 259 Sci. AM. 90, 9495 (1988). The Walter Reed Classification System groups patients by stage of
infection, judged by indicators of immune impairment underlying HIV disease:
stage I is acute infection; stage 2 is chronic lymphadenopathy; stages 3 and 4 are
marked by progressive subclinical immune dysfunction; stage 5, by skin and mucous membrane immune defects; and stage 6, by systemic immune deficiency.
Stage 6 is what we think of as the final stage-AIDS-with most patients dying
within two years of entering stage 6.
8. See Fischl, Richman, Grieco et al.,
The Efficacy of Azidothymidine (AZT) in the
Treatment of Patients with AIDS and AIDS-Related Complex: A Double Blind, PlaceboControlled Trial, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 185 (1987) (AZT administration can decrease mortality and frequency of opportunistic infections); Schmitt, Bigley, McKinnis et al, Neuropsychological Outcome of Zidovudine (AZT) Treatment of Patients with
AIDS and AIDS-Related Complex, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1573, 1573-74 (1988)
(treatment with AZT may reverse neurologic dysfunction caused by HIV infection). For a general survey of AIDS therapies currently under consideration, see
Yarchaon, Mitsuya & Broder, AIDS Therapies, 259 Sc. AM. 110 (1988).
9. Glatt, Chirgwin & Landesman, Treatment of Infections Associated with Human
Immunodeficiency Virus, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1439 (1988) [hereinafter Glatt].
10. Redfield & Burke, supra note 7, at 90. HIV induces the progressive destruction of the T4 lymphocyte, a cell essential to the immune system. Id. Infections and malignancies against which cellular immune mechanisms normally
defend therefore increase. Glatt, supra note 9, at 1439. Such conditions include
parasitic infections, such as Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia; viruses such as
cytomegalovirus; and bacteria, fungi and malignancies such as Kaposi's sarcoma.
See also Rosencranz and Lavey, Treating Patients with Communicable Diseases: Limiting Liability for Physicians and Safeguarding the Public Health, 32 ST. Louis U.L.J. 75,
95-101 (1987).
1I.Unfortunately, its primary current modes of transmission-sexual relations and infected needles-implicate sensitive private activities that do not lend
themselves easily to behavioral change. The effectiveness of education in changing risky behavior is still unclear. See Sisk,.Hewitt & Metcalf, The Effectiveness of
AIDS Education, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1988, at 37. Most people can remain in a
low-risk category for exposure to the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) by
practicing "safer sex," (i.e., limiting sexual contacts and using prophylactics,
avoiding intravenous drug use and taking other precautions such as donating
their own blood in anticipation of elective surgery). For a discussion of the con-
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als-sutgeons, emergency room nurses and others-are in a category of individuals frequently exposed to blood and blood
products of patients who may be HIV-positive or have AIDS.
Over 170,000 patients will be treated for AIDS in 1992.12
"[M]ore than 500 thousand emergency allied health care workers
• . . [treat] 80 million emergency room patients per year in 5,382

hospital-based emergency departments."' 3 Outside the emergency setting, almost 5,000,000 health care personnel in 500
thousand health care facilities have patient contact or are involved
in handling blood products in a variety of settings from elective
4
surgery to drawing patient blood for testing.'
Health care workers lacking prior risk factors have tested
HIV-seropositive after treating patients and handling blood.
Four of eleven such occupationally-related transmissions occurred in emergency room or outpatient settings.' 5 Thus, health
care workers are becoming anxious.'" Their anxiety leads them
to demand that patients be tested for HIV without consent, either
as a standard test in the battery of those customarily performed
upon a patient's admission to a hospital, or when a worker suspects that a patient might be HIV-positive or have AIDS or AIDS
Related Complex (ARC).
Mandatory testing-blood-testing done without the patients'
consent or even their knowledge-has been proposed in the
health care setting as a way to protect health professionals against
the disease. 17 As one such proponent argues: "AIDS testing
traction of AIDS, see generally Wright, AIDS." A Bief Overview, 12
(1988).

NOVA

L.J. 974

12. AIDS 1991 Economic Burden Projected to be 66 Billion, 2 AIDS Policy & Law
(BNA), at 3 (May 6, 1987).
13. Kelen, Fritz, Qaqish et al., Unrecognized Human hnmunodeficiencv 1irus Infection in Emeigencv Department Patients, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1645, 1645 (1988)

[hereinafter Kelen].
14. Mayer, Union W1'ants OSHA to Extend Inspections,

HEALTH WEEK, Dec. 27,
1988, at 8 (health care workers' union wants federal inspectors to inspect more

facilities to ensure proper protection from AIDS for workers).
15. Kelen, supra note 13, at 1645 (citations omitted).
16. Blumenfield, Walter, Smith et al., Survey of Attitudes of Nurses Working with

AIDS Patients, 9

GEN.

Hosp.

PSYCHIATRY

58 (1987) (results of survey indicate

great apprehension among health care workers concerning potential danger to
their health from close contact with AIDS patients).
17. LewinJudge Refuses to Declare AIDS a Sexual Disease, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16,
1988, at AI5, col. 4. A state supreme court judge refused to issue an injunction
to force the New York Health Commissioner to declare AIDS and HIV infection
to be communicable and sexually transmitted diseases. Such a listing would
have meant that a doctor in New York who reasonably suspects that a patient has
the disease has the right to test the patient without consent. Id.
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should be routinely performed on all patients admitted to hospitals. It makes little sense to treat all surgical patients as if they
pose the risk of AIDS to hospital personnel when it is possible to
identify those who are potential sources of infection."", Surreptitious HIV testing of all patients has been implemented in many
hospitals. One study concluded that almost ninety percent of the
HIV tests at one major medical center were done without justification or patient consentA'9
It is not surprising that health care institutions engage in surreptitious testing of patients without their consent, given the
quiet approval by the American Medical Association (AMA) of
such an approach. In an AMA Board of Trustees' report, several
recommendations were proffered..2 1) The AMA wanted ready
availability of voluntary testing, stressing the importance of counseling before tests for AIDS and after a seropositive result. Recommendation I1 stated that "[p]atients should knowingly and
2
willingly give consent before a voluntary test is conducted." '
But Recommendation 6 then compromised much of the patient
protections of the other recommendations:
Voluntary testing should be regularly provided for the
following types of individuals who give informed consent: (1) patients at STD clinics, (2) patients at drug
abuse clinics, (3) pregnant women in high-risk areas in
the first trimester of pregnancy, (4) individuals seeking
family planning services who are from areas with a high
incidence of AIDS or who engage in high-risk behavior,
and (5) patients requiring surgical or other invasive procedures who are from areas with a high incidence of
AIDS or who engage in high-risk behavior. If the voluntary policy is not sufficiently accepted, the hospital and medical
22
staff should consider a mandatory progran for the institution.
Since mandatory testing presumably means that patient consent is
18. Tanay, Psychiatric Reflections on AIDS Education, 18 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS
594, 597 (1988); see also Crenshaw, I-Ill' Testing: 'otuntar , Mandatorv, or Routine?,
48 The Humanist 29 (1988) (there would be widespread voluntary compliance
once testing is recognized as a matter of common sense For health and not as
coercion).
19. Henry, Maki & Crossley, Analysis of the Use of HII' Antibody Testing in a
.Mlinnesota ttospital, 259J. A.M.A. 229 (1988) Ihereinafier Henry].
20. Prevention and Control of Acquired ImmunodeficiencY Syndrome: An Interin Report, 258J. A.M.A. 2097, 2101-03 (1987).

21. Id.
22. Id. (emphasis added).
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no longer sought, this provision defeats the purpose and idea of
informed consent. The implication of the AMA position-"[i]f
the voluntary policy is not sufficiently accepted"-means in effect
that if too many patients exercise their right to refuse testing, a
voluntary position is a failure and the imposition of a mandatory
system is justifiable. This sends a strong message to health care
institutions that they need not encourage voluntary testing.
Government officials have also proposed routine testing,
whether voluntary or not to protect health care workers, to better
track the disease and to identify those infected so that individuals
with HIV can act responsibly. 23 Former Secretary of Education
William Bennett wrote: "There is a strong case to be made for
proposals to make testing routine for hospital admissions; to
make routine testing a part of the treatment at clinics, perhaps
particularly at those serving 'high risk' populations .... .,"24 Routine testing under this proposal becomes the norm, with states
and localities allowing exceptions to routine testing under limited
25
circumstances.
This article argues that routine testing of patients entering a
health care institution is of little benefit in protecting health care
workers. Furthermore, testing of blood without the consent of
the patient greatly compromises the patient's rights and is neither
legally nor morally defensible.
II.

A.

RISKS AND

HIV

TESTING

Risks to Patients: The Costs of Leaked Secrets-Discrimination,
Prejudice and Violence

We live in an imperfect world in which confidences are violated, employees retaliate, acquaintances shun, landlords evict
and strangers stigmatize. Because of these societal reactions, the
act of testing for AIDS imposes significant costs of prejudice and
discrimination on the person tested. -" Tests can have adverse
23. See, e.g., Bennett, AIDS: Education and Public Policy, 7 Sr. Louis U. PUB.

L. REV. 1, 5 (1988).
24. Id. at 6.
25. Id.

26. See 1. GOFFMAN,

STIGMA

5 (1963). Goffman writes:

By definition, of course, we believe the person with a stigma is not quite
human. On this assumption we exercise varieties of discrimination,
through which we effectively, or often unthinkingly, reduce his life
chances, We construct a stigma-theory, an ideology to explain his inferiority and account for the danger he represents, sometimes rationalizing an animosity based on other differences, such as those of social

class.
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consequences even if the result is correct. If the result is incorrect, the consequences can be truly destructive. Societal prejudice means that careless, inaccurate or overzealous HIV testing
can result in the loss of one's job, uninsurability, shunning, adverse psychological consequences, including suicide attempts and
major depressive illnesses, and, with a negative result, a false
27
sense of security.
Further, nonconsensual testing increases the risk of disclosure of an HIV test result, and such disclosure can have substantial detrimental effects. 28 This report by a physician details such
effects:
In 1985, I was the primary physician for a young
man whose life was ruined by the inappropriate disclosure of a positive human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)
antibody test. A physician ordered the test without consent and notified the local health department of the positive result. The health department notified the
individual's employer and he was promptly fired. These
events became common knowledge at his workplace and
in his rural Midwestern town and he was shunned. His
landlord asked him to move. Ten days after testing, the
life he had known for the past ten years was permanently
ruined and he left town. With the loss of his job came
loss of health insurance and insurability; he has been unId.
27. For a discussion of the need for counseling before and after testing, see
Morris, Correspondence, AIDS Counselling and Informed Consent, 294 BRIT. MED. J.
839 (1987). See also the damages alleged by plaintiffs in Doe v. Conly, Civ. No.

CV-88-0486 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 1988); Doe v. Wills Eye Hosp., No. Civ. 5248
(C.P. Philadelphia County Mar. 30, 1988). The plaintiffs, tested without their

knowledge or consent and notified later as to positive HIV results, alleged that
they suffered extreme mental anguish, distress and depression.

Admiral James D. Watkins, Chair of the Presidential Commission on the
Human Immunodeficiency Virus epidemic, expressed concern about discrimination against AIDS victims:
If the nation does not address this issue squarely, it will be very
difficult to solve most other HIV-related problems. People simply will
not come forward to be tested, or will not supply names of sexual contacts for notification, if they feel they will lose their jobs and homes
based on an HIV-positive test. So, once those with HIV are treated like
anyone else with a disability, then we will find that what is best for the
individual is also best for the public health.
Gianelli, Panel's Chairman Urges Radical Change in U.S. l1ar on AIDS, Am. Med.
News, June 17, 1988, at 1, col. 1; at 32, col. 1.

28. Schatz, The AIDS Insurance Crisis: Underwriling or Overreaching?, 100
HARV. L. REv. 1782, 1784 (1987) (footnotes omitted).
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able to obtain health or life insurance since then. 2'9
Such testimony is becoming commonplace. Courts also have
noted the stigmatization and discrimination that may result from
disclosure of AIDS test results.'
Physical violence is yet another cost of the leaked secret of
HIV seropositivity. Violence against homosexuals has escalated
from 4,946 reported cases in 1986 to 7,008 in 1987, suggesting
that the AIDS epidemic has intensified anti-homosexual sentiment." I The public is merging fears of the AIDS epidemic with
negative attitudes toward high-risk groups.
The risk of stigma and its attendant damages from various
forms of discrimination is apparent. While voluntary testing is
often proposed as a desirable public health policy, such a policy
will only work if those who consent to testing can be assured both
full pre- and post-test counseling, and protection from discrimination and violence. However, it appears that such reassurances
cannot be offered. One survey revealed that "[b]etween one in
four and one in five people (one in three in the South) believe
that those with AIDS should be excluded from working with
them, attending school with their children, [sic] and living in their
neighborhoods." 3 2 A person who tests HIV-positive faces a discriminatory mindset and hostility from many Americans. To sub29. Sherer, Phvsician Use of the HI'AntibodY Test. The Needfor Conseit, Counseling, Co/lfidentiality, and Caution, 259J. A.M.A. 264 (1988).
30.One of the important objectives of an AIDS clinic is to encourage
people suffering from AIDS, or who suspect that they may be infected
by te HIV virus, to come in for testing and treatment without the fear
of public disgrace or shame. The stigma which comes from the disclosure that a person is a patient at an AIDS clinic will deter a person from
seeking treatment or testing, particularly at the early stages of the disease before symptoms develop.
Anderson v. Strong Memorial Hosp., 140 Misc. 2d 770, 776, 531 N.Y.S.2d 735,
740 (Sup. Ct. 1988), af'd, 542 N.Y.S.2d 96 (App. Div. 1989).
As another court wrote: "AIDS is the modern day equivalent of leprosy.
AIDS, or a suspicion of AIDS, can lead to discrimination in employment, educatiori, housing and even medical treatment." South Fla. Blood Serv., Inc. v. Rasmussen, 467 So. 2d 798, 802 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
31. Blendon & Donelan, Discrimnination Against People with AIDS. The Public's
Perspective, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1022, 1023 (1988). See Law, Homosexuality, and
the Social weaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 187 (discussion of reasons for
social disapprobation of homosexual behavior, including social reaction to violation of gender norms). Law argues that "the persistence of negative social and
legal attitudes toward homosexuality can best be understood as preserving traditional concepts of masculinity and femininity as well as upholding the political,
market and family structures premised upon gender differentiation." Id. at 188.
32. Blendon & Donelan, supra note 31, at 1026.
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mit to testing is to risk the costs and consequences of that
mindset.
B.

Risks to Medical Staffs

The fear of exposure to HIV, like fear generally, is built on
layers of uncertainty: uncertainty as to who might be infected;
uncertainty as to channels of transmission; and uncertainty as to
the volume of inoculum or blood sufficient to transmit the infection. Individuals' perceptions and reactions to risks are often exaggerated, given the actual risks. 33 People overestimate the
probabilities of falling victim to dramatic and sensational diseases
or injury.3 4 Risky events are often judged as more likely to occur
if they are easy to imagine.3 5 Because health care workers are exposed to the reality of AIDS symptoms and death, they are among
those likely to overestimate the risks of their exposure to HIV and
to search for technological cures to ease their anxieties. This irrational fear, compounded with homophobia, underlies many demands for routine testing.3 " Routine testing is the technological
fix to appease fear of contagion.
Risks to health care workers can be separated into four categories. First, it is necessary to consider the frequency of needle
stick injuries and other exposures by health care workers. Second, the degree of risk must include the proportion of people
treated who are HIV seropositive. These two factors together determine the third risk category-the risk of becoming HIV seropositive through a needle stick or exposure. Fourth, the health
care worker must consider the impact of these risks together in
determining the cumulative risk of HIV infection among health
37
care workers.
33. Slovic, Fischoff & Lichtenstein, Facts Versus Fears: Upnderstanding Perceived
Risk, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (D. Kahneman,
P. Slovic, & A. Tversky eds. 1982).
34. Slovic, Fischoff & Lichtenstein, Behavioral Decision Theoy Perspectives on

Protective Behavior,

in TAKING CARE:
PROTECTIVE BEHAVIOR (N. Weinstin

UNDERSTANDING

AND ENCOURAGING SELF-

ed. 1987).

35. See Tversky & Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions aid the Psychology of
Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981).
36. See Kelly, St. Lawrence, Smith el at., Stigiiatizatioi of AIDS Patientsby Physiciais, 77 AM. J. PUB. HEAI.rH 789 (1987) (important for health care professionals to develop programs to counter unreasonable stigma and prejudicial
attitudes).
37. Emanuel, Do Physicians /lave an Obligatioi to Teiat Patient.S nith .IIDS?, 318
NEW ENG... MNE.
1686, 1688 (1988) (obligation depends on viewing medicine
as prolession which requires some personal risk).
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The Risk of Needle Sticks and Other Exposures

The frequency of needle sticks and other exposures varies by
medical specialty and job. Internists have an overall risk of becoming HIV positive at a rate of about 0.5%.:38 Firefighters in
Boston on the front line face a risk of death of about 0.5% during
each of the worst years and 0.2% in average years.3
Surgeons who operate frequently on AIDS patients may face
higher risks. Assuming forty needle sticks per year, emergency
room doctors in the Kelen study had a 2% annual risk of contracting HIV infection (forty sticks per year, with 4.6% infected
with HIV and 1% risk of HIV infection from each stick). This
41
may present excess risk.

Physicians have a compelling ethical duty to treat patients
with AIDS and a failure to treat breaches this obligation. 4 1 Professional obligations require that physicians treat patients in
need, even at some reasonable risk to personal safety. 42 Health
care workers are at some risk of contagion. For example, surgeons and pathologists may face a risk of contracting hepatitis B
that is five times that of the general population. 43 The risk may
be even higher for dentists. 4 4 Even if the risks facing health care

workers are somewhat higher than the general population, those
risks do not justify wholesale testing. Emanuel writes:
In this respect, medicine is no different from other
occupations in which one is expected to accept some
personal risk in pursuit of one's aim. Thus, it is expected that firefighters will risk burns, even death, to
fight blazes, and that lifeguards will risk injury to rescue
38. Dr. Lorraine Day, Chief of Orthopedics at San Francisco General Hospital, has estimated, without hard data, that even with proper infection control
precautions surgeons will contaminate themselves. She has said that she "may
get stuck 20 times in the next six months." Emanuel, supra note 37, at 1688
(citation omitted).

39. Id.
40. Id. (citation omitted).

41. Id. at 1687.

'his view is endorsed by the AMA. See AMERICAN

MEDICAL

ETHtICAL ISSUES INVOLVED IN TIlE GROWING AIDS CRISIs: REVISED REPORT
OF THE COUNCIL ON ETrICAL ANDJUDICIAL AFFAIRS 4 (1988) (physician "may not

Ass'N,

ethically refuse to treat a patient whose condition is within the physician's current realm of competence" simply because patient is seropositive or has AIDS).
42. Emanuel, sulpra note 37, at 1687.
43. Id.

44. Klein, Phelan, Freeman e aL,. Low Occupational Risk of Humn InmmInodeficiecv I s Ifeclion Auimongr Detal Professittols, 318 NEw ENG. J. MED. 86
(1988).
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drowning people. Taking such risks is part ofjoining the
profession and affirming its objective to help the
45
needy.
The risk of exposure of some health care professionals-certain surgeons for example-may be viewed as excessive. In those
cases, it may be necessary to design policies that limit levels of
risk. Surgeons who are subject to excessive risk could lower the
risk by spreading operations among groups of surgeons or curtailing elective procedures. 4" Nevertheless, in all cases, health
care professionals are expected to take appropriate precautions
given the reality that they will also labor under some uncertainty
about the HIV status of some of their patients with or without
HIV testing.
2.

Risks Arisingfrom the Proportion of Patients Treated Who are HI!'Seropositive

The proportion of patients who may be HIV-positive upon
admission to the health care setting will depend upon the location
of the institution. At the operating suite atJohns Hopkins, Kelen
found that 4% of patients requiring emergency surgery had unrecognized HIV infection. 4 7 The Kelen group found that 119 of
2,302 consecutive adult patients, or 5.2%, were seropositive for
HIV; furthermore, among 2,275 patients with unknown HIV status, only 659 (29%) were determined by the clinical team as being
in a high-risk group. 48 Kelen concluded that
[o]f the patients who presented with active bleeding, 6.0
percent were seropositive, and 3.8 percent of the patients who were transported to the hospital by ambulance and in whom access to peripheral veins was
necessary before they arrived at the hospital were seropositive. More than 4 percent of the patients who were
admitted, including 4.6 percent of the patients who required emergency major surgery in the operating suite,
45. Emanuel, supra note 37, at 1687.

46. Id.
47. Kelen, sua note 13, at 1645. See also Baker, Kelen, Sivertson & Quinn,
"nsu.Imled Human Immnnodeficiencv Virusn Critically I/ Emergency Patients, 257 ,1.
A.M.A. 2609, 2610 (1987) (three percent of critically ill or severely injured pa-

iients with no history of HIV infection were seropositive in indigent, urban
ar ea).
48. Kelen, sunra note 13, at 1645-47.
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were found to have unrecognized HIV infection. 41
The authors noted that Centers for Disease Control (CDC)
recommendations for universal precautions were not followed.
Only the twenty-seven patients known to be seropositive for HIV
were treated with special precautions. The 2,275 patients with
unknown HIV status were treated with no special measures except for the use of gloves when blood was drawn. The authors
noted that the risk of exposure to unrecognized HIV infection
and to bodily fluids is not trivial since many of the patients admitted (4.1%) were seropositive. Of those admitted directly to the
operating suite, 4.6% were unrecognized as HIV-seropositive.
"Because there are an estimated 1 to 1.7 million asymptomatic
HIV-infected persons in the United States, the potential risk of
exposure for emergency department personnel and other health
care workers can only increase.- 51 ) Attempts to apply risk-factor
assessment would miss many patients, such as those entering the
emergency room with altered mental status, active bleeding and
negative test results (since two of five tested positive on admission). The authors concluded that only "universal blood and
body fluid precautions" would adequately protect health care
workers: "[I]nfection-control precautions should be consistently
applied, particularly in emergency settings, by all health care
workers coming in contact with blood or other body fluids,
whether HIV infection is known or suspected, and regardless of
patients' condition at presentation or knowledge of their risk-fac5
tor status." '
3.

The Risk of Becoming HII'-Positivefrom a Single Needle Stick

Needle stick injuries are the most important risk event for
most health care workers. The risk of becoming HIV-positive after one needle stick has been estimated at less than 1 % for lab
workers and health care workers, with one study calculating the
risk of HIV transmission from a single needle stick accident at
0.35 %.52 At least fifteen cases have been reported of health care
workers with HIV infection caused by needle sticks. 53 The risk of
49. Id. at 1648.
50. Id. at 1649.
51. Id.
52. Wormser, Rabkin & Joline, Frequency of .Vosocomial Transmission of H1
Infection Among Health Care lorkers, 319 Nrvw ENG. J. MED.307-08 (1988) (one of
every 10 needle stick accidents occurs in caring For HIV-infected patient).
53.
I "date:

I)"T oF HEAIII & HUMAN SERV.,
Svndrome and Human hnmunodeficiencY U'rns Ih!fec-

CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROl., U.S.
.lcquired ImmnodeJiciency
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seroconversion after a needle stick depends on the size of the inoculum. Some of the health care workers who tested positive after a needle stick suffered not just a stick but the injection of
blood. 5 4 One study of health care workers at San Francisco General Hospital with a year of exposure to AIDS patients, 35% having sustained accidental exposure to patient fluids, found no
55
seroconversion.

The level of exposure to needle stick injuries can be reduced
by attention to proper procedures for handling needles. Equipment can be modified to reduce the risks, including replacing antiquated containers with safer designs. 5 6 Both manufacturers and

health care institutions can create a safer working environment by

57
taking advantage of new technology to reduce worker exposure.
While seroconversion has been reported after exposure to HIV
through skin and mucous membranes, that risk is much lower. 58
Needle sticks remain a serious risk factor that must be addressed
in the health care setting.

4.

The Cumulative Risk of HIV Infection to Health Care Workers
The cumulative risk of HIV infection among health care

workers is roughly equivalent to the risk level in the general poption Among Health Care Workers, 37 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 229,
232 (1988) (risk of seroconversion following needle stick exposure to blood of
HIV-infected patient is less than one percent); CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL,
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., Recommendations for Prevention of HIV
Transmissionsin Health-CareSettings, 36 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 5S
(1987 Supp.) [hereinafter Recommendations] (as of April 30, 1987, of 332 exposed
health care workers, 103 were exposed by needle sticks). See also Weiss,
Goedert, Gartner et al., Risk of Human ImniunodeficiencT Virus (HI-1) Iifection
Among Laboratoryv Workers, 239 SCIENCE 68 (1988) (study of 265 laboratory and
affiliated workers concluded incidence rate of 0.48 per 100 person-years exposure to concentrated virus, which is comparable to risk of needle stick exposure
by health care workers). For a summary of the report, see Allen, Health Care
ll'orkers and the Risk of Hll' Transmission, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, Apr.-May
1988, at 2 (Special Supplement).
54. Allen, supra note 53, at 4.
55. Gerberding, Bryant, LeBlanc et. al., Risk of Transmitting the Human Ininilnodeficiencv V'irus, Cytomegalovirus, and HepatitisB. Virus to Health Care Workers Exposed
to Patients with AIDS and AIDS-Related Conditions, 156 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 1-8
(July 1987) (study results indicate that health care workers are at minimal risk for
HIV transmission from occupational exposure to AIDS patients).
56. Kempen, Equipment Aodifications to Reduce Needle Sticks, 319 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 308 (1988) (use of European intravenous cannulae eliminates need for
needles and is cost-effective way of reducing needle stick injuries).
57. Jagger, Hunt, Brand-Elnaggar & Pearson, Rates of Needle-Stick Itntiry
Caused by Various Devices in a University Hospital, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 284, 287
(1988).
58. See Reconmimendations, supra note 53.
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ulation. The distribution by age, race and sex of those with AIDS
employed in health care is similar to all AIDS cases. 591 A review of
studies done to date, combining 1,400 health care workers and
1,300 dental personnel, concluded that the risk of HIV infection
in health care workers was generally quite low.3°
Studies of health care workers exposed to contaminated
blood through the skin or mucous membranes have shown that
such contact rarely results in the transmission of HIV. In one
study, none of the 103 workers with skin exposures and none of
the 229 workers with mucous membrane exposures to the blood
or body fluids of patients with AIDS were seropositive."' Of the
three reported cases of transmission, two occurred in the outpatient clinic setting and one resulted from a resuscitation effort in
2
an emergency room shortly after the arrival of the patient.
While some health care workers are at increased occupational risk compared to other professions because of the risk of
exposure to patient blood products, the risk appears to have been
overstated. Dental professionals are often exposed repeatedly to
persons who are HIV-positive for months or years before the patients know they are positive, and accidental parenteral inoculations and splashes and aerosolizations of blood and saliva are
common; therefore, dental professionals are considered to be a
sentinel population for potential HIV exposure. However, one
study has found dental professionals to be at less risk than might
be expected. "3: It has been suggested, therefore, that the risk to
dental professionals "is likely to indicate the maximal anticipated
4
rate of occupational risk for health care workers in general."1
The authors of the dental study concluded that "despite infre59. Allen, supra note 53, at 2. Allen states that 95.1% of health care workers have a risk factor for HIV infection unrelated to employment. Id. Moreover,
the "maximum estimate" even where the worker was exposed to mucous membrane or inoculation of blood, was one risk of infection in 200 incidents. Id. at 4.
60. Id.
61. Recommendations, supra note 53, at 5S. See also An Uneyplained AIDS Infection, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 14, 1987, at 63 (discussion of AIDS transmitted through
skin and mucous membrane exposure). A later study noted that the observed
rate of HIV infection among dentists was one in 3396, a rate that pales in comparison to other causes of death for dentists in any given year. Klein, Phelan,
Freeman et al., Dentists and the Risk ofiIll', 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 112, 114 (1988).
62. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV.,
Update. Human Inmmunodeficiency 'irus Infections in Health-Care Workers Exposed to
Blood of Infected Patients, 36 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REIP. 285-86 (1987).
63. Klein, Phelan, Freeman et al., Low Occnpational Risk of Hiniman Immunodeficienc-v 'irus Injection Among Dental Professionals, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 86
(1988).
64. Id. at 89.
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quent compliance with recommended infection-control precautions, frequent occupational exposure to persons at increased risk
for HIV infection, and frequent accidental parenteral inoculations
with sharp instruments, dental professionals currently are at low
65
occupational risk for HIV infection." ,
C.

Risks of Not Testing Patients

Technology often drives policy in our culture, and health
care is no exception. The tests for HIV are powerful tools, and
they are getting better. The very existence of these tests creates a
desire in health care providers to use them without sufficient introspection about the purposes and consequences of their use.
This technological imperative leads to an often unstated presumption in favor of the use of a technology such as a diagnostic
test, even when its usefulness is not clearly established."" Once a
patient enters the hospital or clinic, the imperative begins to operate in the minds of the staff: test and get information on the
patient's HIV status. Ordinarily, the justification for such intervention has been to promote the welfare of the patient. In the
7
case of HIV testing, the justification is to protect the staff."
Any proposal to test groups of people might be evaluated by
answering three groups of questions: First, why test? Second,
how good is the test? How does its performance measure up,
based on its sensitivity, specificity and predictive value in populations with different prevalences of the disease? Third, what are
the consequences of testing?"8 Each of these issues will be addressed in turn.
1. The Alleged Purpose of Testing
In the health care setting, the argument is that health care
workers could use the HIV test results of patients to better pro65. Id. The authors noted that risky patients cannot be detected reliably,
and that infected persons may not feel or appear ill. They may not want to inform the dentist or may not consider themselves at high risk. Testing takes time,
requires confirmatory testing, and may yield false negatives. Id.

66. See generallvJ.

ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETy

(1964). "Ours is a

progressively technical civilization .... It is a civilization committed to the quest
for continually improved means to carelessly examined ends." Id. at vi.
67. Thomas, The Perits of AIDS Testing, L.A. LAW 39, 46 (Sept. 1988) ("[T]oo
many health care professionals are acting from fear and not scientific knowledge
in requesting (and in some cases demanding) that their patients undergo HIV
testing.").
68. Weiss & Thier, IIl' Testing is the ,-nswer-ll'hat' the Question?, 319 NEW
ENG.J. MED. 1010 (1988).
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tect themselves from infection. "[I]f all patients entering the hospital were tested for HIV, hospital workers could take extra
precautions against occupational exposure." ' 11
2.

Accuracy of Testing

A person is identified as HIV-positive when a sequence of
tests, starting with repeated enzyme immunoassays (ELISA) and
including a Western Blot (WB), are repeatedly reactive. Persons
infected with HIV, which acts as an antigen, usually develop antibodies against the virus within six to twelve weeks after infection. These tests do not test for HIV itself, but rather are an
indirect test for HIV in that they react to the antibodies developed by the body in reaction to the HIV infection. Some false
positives are expected with these tests, depending on the prevalence of infection in the populations tested.71 The lower the level
of infection generally in the population, the higher the false positive rate. 7 ' Increased prevalence of the disease in the population
affects the predictive value by reducing the relative level of false
positives.7 2 False negatives will also occur because of the latency
period of weeks between the onset of HIV infection and appearance of detectable antibodies. False negatives also occur because
some individuals contain the HIV virus in macrophages and
therefore do not develop detectable antibodies for months or
years. 73 Some infected individuals will therefore be missed by the
74
ELISA test.
A confirming test, usually a repeat ELISA test followed by a
WB test, is required to improve the accuracy of the initial test.
While this reduces the number of false positives, the WB is also
75
an indirect test that may give false positives.
69. Id. at 1101.
70. See Goedert, Testingfor Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 105

ANNALS INTER-

609 (1986); see also Barry, Mulley & Singer, Screeningfor ITL V-Il Antibodies: The Relationship between Prevalence and Positive Predictive Value and its Social
NAL MED.

Consequences, 253J. A.M.A. 3395 (1985) (adverse consequences of AIDS testing).
71. Meyer & Pauker, Screeningfor 11V Can We Afford the False Positive Rate?,
317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 238 (1987).

72. For a discussion of sensitivity, specificity and prevalence as parameters
of the predictive value of a test, see Banks & McFadden, Rush tojudgnient: HIVl
Test Reliability and Screening, 23 TULSA L.J. 1, 7 (1987).
73. See Zonana, Norko & Stier, The AIDS Patient on the Psychiatric Unit: Ethical
and Legal Issues, 18 PSvCHIATRIc ANNALS 587, 588 (1988).
74. Ranki, Valle, Krohn et. al., Long Latency Precedes Overt Seroconversion in Sexually Transmitted Humnan Imiiunodeficiency- Virus Infection, II LANCET 589 (1987).
75. See Roy, Portney, Wainberg & Davis, Need for Caution in Inteipretation of
Western Blot Testsfor HI, 257J. A.M.A. 1047 (1987) (suggesting that blood banks
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The sensitivity of the currently licensed tests is at least 99%
when they are performed under optimal laboratory conditions on
serum specimens from persons infected for more than twelve
weeks. A newer test, an antibody detection procedure called the
autologous red cell agglutination test, "is potentially suitable for
simple, rapid, qualitative screening for antibodies to a variety of
antigens." 7" The test takes less than two minutes to complete. It
is hoped that such a test "will contribute to the protection of
health care workers and aid in the control of the spread of
AIDS."

77

The promise of the instant AIDS test is less encourag-

ing than it may appear. The accuracy of such tests and the quality
78
of the laboratories using them remain problematic.
a.

Laboratory Shortcomings

The predictive value of a positive test for HIV has been low
among populations with low prevalence rates of HIV. That is, the
ratio of false positive to true positive diagnoses would be unacceptable. The military HIV screening program has claimed a low
rate of one false positive in 135,187 tests in its mandatory screening of recruits. 719 But the American military screening program is
a "carefully designed, high-volume, closely monitored program"8"" with several special features to ensure accuracy, including meticulous screening of the laboratories used. As the authors
of the military screening study themselves note: "HIV testing in
the civilian sector may not be done in laboratories that have such
large volumes and extensive experience in the performance and
use both HIV-infected and noninfected cell lines when confirming seropositivity
by Western Blot test).
76. Kemp, Rylatt, Bundesen et al., Autologous Red Cell Agglutination Assay for
1111' 1 Antibodies: Simplified Test with Whole Blood, 241 SCIENCE 1352, 1352 (1988).
77. Id. at 1354. The article identifies a false positive rate of 0.1% with
healthy blood donors versus 0.2% when compared to the same samples tested
with the commercial test used by a blood transfusion service. "Apparent false
positive reactions with the autologous agglutination test were observed more
frequently in hospitalized patients than in healthy blood donors." Id.
78. Cambridge BioScience has received FDA approval to market a blood
test that will tell in five minutes whether a person is HIV-positive. The company
expects that such a test will help doctors and nurses in emergency rooms and on
transplant teams. Ai Instant AIDS Test, TIME, Dec. 26, 1988, at 70. Concerns
have been expressed over the accuracy of such tests, and the need for a mechanism to counsel those who may use the "instant" home tests on the horizon. See
Leary, Home Tests for AIDS: Concept is Attractive, But Experts are Wary, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 16, 1989, at B15, col. 1.
79. Burke, Brundage, Redfield et al., 4Ieasurement of the False Positive Rate itt a
Screening Programfor Iuniian Inoimodeficieic) Virus lnfections, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED.
961 (1988).
80. Id. at 963.
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interpretation of tests for HIV, especially Western blotting."'
The quality of laboratory testing in private commercial laboratories varies substantially since accepted national standards are
not yet in place. Many of the commercial labs testing for the
AIDS virus offer a substandard service. The Army's screening of
labs for its use found ten of nineteen labs evaluated to be substandard in that they could not analyze samples to a level of 95% accuracy.8 2 Analysis of laboratory proficiency data by one expert
revealed that the false positive rate for HIV tests in low-risk populations would be even greater if the rate were adjusted for the
probable accuracy rates of participating laboratories.8 13 One
study found a false positive rate as high as one in fifteen specimens tested.8 4 While laboratory experience has improved and
quality controls make a substantial difference, the risk of both excessive false positives and errors remains substantial.
b.

Staff Errors

The results of studies on the quality of HIV testing in hospital settings have not been encouraging. One study evaluated
clinical use of HIV antibody serology in a large Minnesota medical center.8 5 The authors of the study found:
In 44% of the tests performed, the patient had no recognized risk factor for acquiring HIV infection ....

In an

additional 44% of tests performed, the test was medically indicated but patient consent and counselling were
not documented ....

Only 10% of tests performed ful-

filled the criteria for an appropriate test (where the test
was indicated and consent and counseling were provided
with documentation in the medical record).8 "
Errors were common. Eleven patients were tested with no record
81. Id. at 963-64.
82. Thomas, supra note 67, at 43.
83. Qualit. AIDS Testing: Hearing Before the Subconmiltee on Regulation and Business Opportunities, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-12 (1987) (testimony of Dr. Lawrence
Miike, AIDS Laboratory Testing Analyst, Office of Technology Assessment).
Miike conjectured that the laboratory performance was probably worse than the
tests suggested, since the labs knew they were being tested and could take extra
care with the proficiency test specimens. Id. at 3.
84. Burke & Redfield, False-Positive ll'ester, Blot Tests for Antibodies to HTLI'III, 256J. A.M.A. 347 (1986).
85. Henry, sipra note 19, at 229.
86. Id. at 232.
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of who ordered the test or why. 8 7 With six patients, a positive
ELISA result was interpreted by physicians as a positive test without regard to a negative WB.8a In five patients, asymptomatic seropositive HIV patients were diagnosed as having AIDS." ' In one
case, a patient specimen was mislabeled.11°
Other studies have confirmed the extent to which physicians
and health care professionals generally remain poorly informed
about the meaning of a positive HIV serotest. : ' While patient education about AIDS is vital, physicians and staff also need to be
better educated about the accuracy of HIV testing and proper
procedures for achieving accurate results.
3.

Results of Testing. Alleviating Workers' Risk Versus Adverse Patient
Consequences

Even if instantaneous antigen tests are developed, and false
positive and negative rates caused by laboratory error are dramatically reduced, routine mandatory testing without patient consent
still cannot be justified. An example of a poorly justified screening program was the sickle cell trait screening which occurred
during the 1970s. Such screening was ultimately abandoned
since positive sickle cell carrier status "led to harm to personal
and social relations and to discrimination in insurance, in employment, and even in the schoolyard."' 12 This result can be compared to AIDS testing where "the results of mandatory testing are
unlikely to offer much benefit to the individual screened, while
exposing that person to many economic, social, psychological,
and even physical harms.!"' The information gained by HIV testing is not of particular benefit in most health care settings, especially if universal precautions and other safeguards are
followed.1 4 The CDC has maintained that "[t]he utility of routine
HIV serologic testing of patients as an adjunct to universal pre87. Id. at 231.
88. Id.

89. Id.
90. Id.
9 1. See Searle, Knowledge, Allitudes, and Behavior of Iealth Professionals in Relation to AIDS, I LANCET 26 (1987) (surveying British health professionals' knowl-

edge, attitudes and behavior in relation to AIDS).
92. Capron, "So Quick Bright Things Come to Confusion," 13 AM. J.L. & MED.
169, 181 (1987).

93. Id.
94. See Weiss & Thier, supra note 68, at 1011 ("Illf recommendations to
take universal precautions are followed, it is unclear what further action the additional information suggests.").
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cautions is unknown. Results of such testing may not be available
in emergency or outpatient settings.'"' 5 The CDC also warns that
routine testing will provide little comfort to health care workers
because recently-infected patients will not demonstrate detecta96
ble antibodies to HIV.

III.

LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

Social norms are an important source of law. "Law represents in a stylized way the concerns, the social organization, the

aspirations, the political life of a particular society in a particular
place and time .... Looking at legal doctrine when judges pretty
it up for public display tells us something important about ideals

of justice."' - 7 Tort law and constitutional law subject individual
conduct and governmental behavior to judicial scrutiny in the
light of legal values.
The legal principles that should guide policy in the area of
AIDS testing are beacons to guide the conduct of health care
providers. These principles illuminate the proper constraints on
defensive, fearful behavior by health care institutions. These
principles include: (1) the principle of autonomy and informed

consent; 1 (2) the principle of preserving secrets and the right to
privacy; '!) and (3) the principle of reasonableness.")" It is worth-

while to elaborate on and re-establish these legal principles as a
counterpoint to the powerful medical imperative to use testing as
a tool for safeguarding staff.""

The legal constraints tip the

95. Recommendations, supra note 53, at 14.
96. Id. (adherence to precautions recommended for care of all patients will
minimize risk of transmission of HIV; utility of routine HIV serologic testing as
adjunct to precautions unknown).
97. K. SHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE COMMON LAW 316 (1988).
98. For a discussion of this principle, see infra notes 102-15 and accompa-

nying text. See generallv Goff, AIDS: The Legal Issues,

[HE WASHINGTON LAWYER,

Mar.-Apr. 1988, at 36; Preserving the Public Health: A Proposalto QuarantineRecalcitrant AIDS Carriers, 68 B.U.L. REV. 441 (1988).
99. For a discussion of this principle, see infra notes 116-60 and accompanying text. See generally Closen, Connor, Kaufman & Wojcik, AIDS: Testing Democracy-Irrational Responses to the Public Health Crisis and the Need for Privacy in
Serologic Testing, 19J. MARSHALL L. REV. 835 (1986); Comment, Doctor-PatientConfidentiality 'erus Duty to Warn in the Context of AIDS Patients and Their Partners, 47
MD. L. REV. 675 (1988).
100. For a discussion of this principle, see infa notes 161-202 and accompanying text. See generally Banks & McFadden, supra note 72; Hermann, AIDS:
Ialpractice and Transnission Liabilit,, 58 U. CoLo. L. REV. 63 (1986-87).
101. Rosencranz & Lavey, su/a note 10; see also W.J. Lewis, M.D., The AIDS
Epidemic: Providing Competent Compassionate Medical Care and Preserving

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol34/iss5/4

20

Furrow: AIDS and the Health Care Provider: The Argument for Voluntary HIV

1989]

HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS AND

HIV TESTING

843

scale, requiring that testing first pass threshold tests of patient
consent and assurances of protection of private information from
disclosure before it can be employed.
A.

The Principle of Autonomy: Informed Consent

The informed consent doctrine is based upon the premise
that a patient has the right to make an informed choice about
medical options for diagnosis and treatment. The doctrine is
rooted in a model of the physician-patient relationship in which
decision making is a collaborative process rather than a one-way
path."1 2 When doctors' treat competent patients, the informed
consent doctrine has provided some impetus for the sharing of
decision-making power between doctor and patient. " The doctrine represents a wavering judicial attempt to establish boundaries for the doctor-patient relationship.
4
The doctrine of informed consent serves several functions. 10
First, it promotes patient self-determination. The historic origins
of the doctrine address the right of an individual to be free from
unconsented interference with his person. Such concerns reflect
the moral principle that it is primafacie wrong to force individuals
to act against their will. Such a principle is a value in itself, independent of any instrumental goals that may be achieved. It is a
value because, in the words of H.L.A. Hart, "it enables individuals to experiment-even with living-and to discover things valuable both to themselves and to others.""' 5 The requirement that
a doctor inform a patient of the risks of and alternatives to a particular therapy, or the nature of the tests to be done, reconfirms
the status of the patient as a thinking person, capable of sharing
in the decision making. Neither person can command the participation of the other, but must obtain it freely. ""' To fail to disclose to patient the risks and consequences is to reduce him to a
the Rights and Dignity of the Patient (Widener University School of Law, unpublished manuscript in possession of author).
102. See J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 130-64
(1984).
103. See Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARV. L. REV. 375, 428
(1988).
104. The functions of informed-consent include: (1) protection of patient
self-determination; (2) minimizing coercion of the patient; (3) avoidance of unrealistic patient expectations; (4) enhancement of therapeutic self-scrutiny; and
(5) fostering rational decision making. I have developed these justifications in
more detail in B. FURROW, MALPRACTICE IN PSYCHOTIERAPY 65-68 (1980).
105. H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 21-22 (1963).
106. See Capron, Informed Consent in Calastrophic Disease Research and Trealnment,
123 U. PA. L. REV. 340, 367 (1974).
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level of dependency in which he has been judged incapable of
making his own decisions.
Second, the doctrine may also minimize patient coercion.
The inequality of information and power between health care
professionals and patients in the typical medical relationship
means that any notion of a contract is a fiction. The exchange of
information between doctor and patient reduces the disparity and
enables the patient to make his own informed decision.
Finally, informed consent encourages a joint venture between doctor and patient in which disclosure of information will
promote patient decision making. 1o7 This joint venture promotes
patient autonomy in his own decision regarding treatment, where
8
the patient understands the consequences of his decision. 10
It may be argued that, in general, the informed consent doctrine has done little to insure that patients are an integral part of
the treatment process.'(! Nevertheless, the values that the doctrine represents are important in that they are based on social
norms that we value as a society, so called "autonomy" norms.
Society values individual control over decisions concerning one's
body and self (even though others may find those decisions irrational), as well as the right to full information before making difficult medical choices and the right to control information about
oneself that can prove destructive if generally known (i.e.,
secrets). These autonomy norms focus on information, access to
it and control of it.
However, the autonomy-based rights often conflict with
other social norms, such as the right of third parties to obtain
information about risks or to be protected from the risk-creating
107. SeeJ.

KATZ,

supra note 102, at 130-64.

108. Under the informed consent doctrine, the existence of a duty to disclose is determined on the basis of whether the reasonable practitioner similarly
situated would disclose the information. See B. FURROW, S. JOHNSON, T. Jos-r &
R. SCHWARTZ,

HEALTH

LAW: CASES,

MATERIALS

AND PROBLEMS

246 n.1 (1987)

[hereinafter B. FURROW]. If the duty to disclose exists, the doctrine requires that
a doctor disclose the diagnosis, the nature and purpose of the treatment, the
risks of the treatment, the probability of success, the treatment alternatives and
the prognosis if the treatment is no( given. Id. at 247-48 (and cases cited). Failure to disclose the risks of a treatment and possible alternatives to a treatment

have been held to be tortious in that it fails to respect the patient's right to selfdetermination. Keogan v. Holy Family Hosp., 95 Wash. 2d 306, 622 P.2d 1246
(1980) (doctrine of informed consent is based on patient's right to self-determination; physician's duty to disclose arises whenever physician becomes aware of
abnormalities indicating possible risk or danger).
109. See C. LiDm, A. NEIsEi., E. ZE'biUAVEL, M. CARTER, R. SEsTAK & L.
Rorii, INFORMEtD CONSENT:

A

STUDY OF I)ECISIONMAKINc, IN PSYCHIATRY

326

(1984).
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behavior of others. But autonomy deserves serious weight in calibrating the scales before there is any social or political balancing
The conflict between the paof public and private interests.'
tient and the health care professional may be inevitable, and the
law can provide a valuable counterbalance to professional
dominance. I I

Consider the argument that HIV testing is really just another
"routine" test for which informed consent is neither needed nor
desirable. The consent of the patient to routine testing is viewed
as implied by the patient's act in presenting himself for treatment.
Treatment requires diagnosis; diagnosis requires testing as part
of the search for causes; and such routine diagnostic testing is,
therefore, impliedly consented to by the patient.' 12
Calling HIV testing "routine" is not supportable. First, while
testing patient blood for conditions to which the patient has not
consented may be standard practice, it is not justifiable on principles of informed consent generally. Second, even if much testing
of patient blood without consent may be a trivial ethical violation,
HIV testing certainly cannot be considered to be such. A positive
reading can be devastating to the individual and extremely destructive if disclosed, while a false negative can breed a false sense
of security. Any judicial look at such testing would find such
levels of risks to be significant to the patient. 3' Third, such test110. The writings of Jay Katz best develop the autonomy justifications for
informed consent in the medical world. SeeJ. KATZ, supra note 102 (discussion of
need for informed decision making on part of patient); Katz, infornied Consent-A
Fai, Tale: Law's Vision, 39 U. PITr. L. REV. 137 (1977) (discussion of need for
doctor-patient interaction for autonomous decision making); see also Meisel, A
'Dignitary Tort'As A Bridge Between the Idea of Informed Consent and the Law of Informed
Consent, 16 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 210 (1988) (need for increased patient
autonomy).
111. See Wolf, Conflict Betweeni Doctor and Patient, 16 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE
197 (1988).
112. In Plowman v. United States Dep't of the Army, 698 F. Supp. 627
(E.D. Va. 1988), the district court dismissed a suit brought by a civilian employee of the Department of the Army, who had tested HIV positive in a nonconsensual testing by Army doctors, was forced to resign, and who then sued his
supervisor. The court cited to two other recent decisions upholding use of a
person's blood sample for an HIV test as long as the sample "was already required for a series of other diagnostic tests." 1d. at 636. The court seemed to
treat HIV testing as just another harmless diagnostic procedure with no psychological or other repercussions to the patient or to third parties, and yet, in a
footnote, observed that HIV testing was not a routine feature of diagnostic
blood tests, contrary to the allegations of the defendants that the plaintiff had
consented to the HIV test by consenting to the withdrawal of blood generally.
Id. at 629 n.6.
113. For further discussion of a variety of risks to patients, see supra notes
26-32 and accompanying text.
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ing violates the principle of beneficence-that medical interventions should be done for the good of the patient. Testing under
1 14
these conditions is primarily for the putative protection of staff.
Further, failure to implement routine pre-test counseling could
lead to tremendous patient distress if the results are disclosed to
them, both because they were deceived and acted upon without
permission and because a positive result is distressing to a patient
not properly given pre-test counseling.' 15 Finally, nonconsensual
routine patient testing may risk harm to third parties. If positive
test results are kept secret, then the patient will lack crucial information about his AIDS status. He may therefore expose third
parties through sexual contacts. The failure of medical personnel
to act on the test information may violate tort requirements that
third parties be warned of risks created by a party with whom the
medical staff has a relationship.
B.

The Principle of PreservingSecrets.- The Right to Privacy

Secrecy is the desire to intentionally withhold information
from others, usually on a rational basis.' l The creation and protection of secrets is an intentional and social act. 117 Secrets are
valuable means of defining the social world by censoring social
spaces from others. Secrets are also "tools of power."',X As
Scheppele writes: "[W]hile secrets enable the social world to be
114. Gillon, Testing for H11' Without Permission, 294 BRIT. MED. J. 821, 823
(1987). See Swartz, AIDS Testing and Informed Consent, 13 J. HEALTH POLITICS
POLICY & L. 607 (1988), for a recent statement in strong support of voluntary
testing and requirement of informed consent in all health care settings prior to
HIV testing.
115. See, e.g., Doe v. Wills Eye Hospital, No. Civ. 5248 (C.P. Philadelphia
County Mar. 30, 1988), in which the plaintiff alleged as damages:
20. As the direct result of the shock of being informed without
warning that he tested positive for AIDS, plaintiff suffered, and continues to suffer, severe mental anguish, distress, and related psychological
conditions. Plaintiff's mental stress and depression has resulted in a
general deterioration of his physical health, including stress-related fatigue and insomnia.
21. As the direct result of the mental distress and physical symptoms resulting therefrom, plaintiff has experienced, and continues to
experience, severe limitation on his ability to concentrate at work, with
the result that his productivity, and his income, has and will continue to
be reduced.
22. Additionally, plaintiff has been unable to engage or participate in his normal life activities, as a result of his physical symptoms
and the depression and other psychological ill-effects he has suffered.
116. See K. SCtEI'PPELE, supra note 97, at 12-13.
117. Id. at 14.
118. Id. at 5.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol34/iss5/4

24

Furrow: AIDS and the Health Care Provider: The Argument for Voluntary HIV

1989]

HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS AND

HIV

TESTING

847

partitioned and individualized, making the expression of individual autonomy in the construction of the social world possible,
they also serve as staging grounds for the deployment of power,
assaults on the very autonomy that they constitute."' ' 19 The assessment of privacy as a fundamental right, therefore, requires a
look at the nature of the secrets that are being withheld and the
purposes for keeping them.
An individual's secret information about his health status
may be valuable to him, a secret to be shared only selectively and
carefully. As Fried states:
Privacy is not simply an absence of information
about us in the minds of others; rather it is the control
we have over information about ourselves

....

But it is

not simply control over the quantity of information
abroad; there are modulations in the quality of the
knowledge as well ....

For instance, a casual acquain-

tance may comfortably know that I am sick, but it would
violate my privacy if he knew the nature of the illness....
Privacy in its dimension of control over information
2
is an aspect of personal liberty. 11
HIV test results, as we have seen, may result in grave harm if disclosed to others without the permission of the patient. Yet health
care institutions are not respectors of secrets. Patient information contained in medical records is frequently disclosed. It has
been estimated that up to seventy-five people (including nurses,
administrators and insurers) have access to the typical patient's
chart.' 12 ' The power to devastate an individual lies with the
holder of that person's medical record. That power can be limited both by allowing patients to control what the record contains,
in the case of test results, and by imposing a duty to maintain
22
confidentiality, backed by sanctions for its breach.
A patient may want to share his secret-an HIV-positive test
result-with a health care provider for a valid treatment objective
119. Id.
120. C. FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES 140-41 (1970).
121. B. FURROW, supra note 108, at 220. See also Wilkes & Shuchman, "Holy
Secrets," N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1988 (Magazine) at 57, 58 ("In general, a hospital is
one of the most difficult settings in which to protect confidentiality. Information
a patient and doctor consider private may get out.").
122. See Turkington, Legal Protectionfor the Confidentialilv of Health Care Information in Pennsylvania: Patient and Client Access; Testimonial Privileges;Damage Recovery for l natithorized Extra-Legal Disclosure, 32 VILL. L. REV. 259 (1987).
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or for sound medical advice if he can minimize the risk that the
secret will be revealed to others. He may want to share it with
others in his life as long as he can decide when and how. Given
the risk of disclosure of patient secrets, however, and the fact that
repercussions continue to follow from such revelations, the law
must protect such secrets unless the patient has made an informed decision to, risk the consequences of their disclosure.
A right to privacy is not firmly anchored in our constitutional
jurisprudence. 12'3 The Supreme Court has carefully avoided recognizing the right of privacy in sharp, clearly delineated terms. In
Whalen v. Roe,124 the Court recognized that a privacy claim might
include two classes of interests: "the interest in independence in
making certain kinds of important decisions" pertaining to family,
procreation, and medical treatment,12 5 and the "interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters."' 2" The Court, however, declined to expressly grant such interests constitutional protection,
finding that the applicable New York law gave adequate
protection. '

2 7

The Supreme Court, in cases following Whalen, has looked at
the sensitive nature of the information. In Nixon v. Administratorof
General Services,' 28 the Court applied the interest in "avoiding disclosure of personal matters"1 21 set out in Whalen in recognizing
ex-President Nixon's legitimate expectation of privacy in communications between himself and his family and minister. In Detroit
Edison v. NLRB, 1i"° the Court further built on Whalen and overturned an NLRB order requiring that employees' psychological
test results be distributed without their consent.' 3 1 The Court
considered this information sensitive and the risk of unauthorized
123. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Supreme Court
first developed a right of marital privacy in the penumbra of the Bill of Rights.
Id. at 484. This right was expanded in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972),
to include the right of unmarried people to make contraceptive decisions, clarifying what Tribe has labeled the right of "reproductive autonomy." L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-10, at 1339 (2d ed. 1988). Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973), extended this right to cover a woman's abortion decision.
Tribe characterizes this decision as one that "affirmed the value of individual
autonomy over the virtue of collective choice and the prerogative of majoritarian
coercion." L. TRIBE, supra, at 1352.
124. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
125. Id. at 599-600.

126. Id. at 599.
127. Id. at 598.
128. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
129. fl'halen, 429 U.S. at 599.
130. 440 U.S. 301 (1979).
131. Id. at 317-20.
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disclosure substantial and, therefore, sufficiently personal to fall
under the Whalen doctrine. 3 2 The Court noted that federal and
state legislation recognized "a person's interest in preserving the
confidentiality of sensitive information."'1" Most federal courts
have read Whalen as acknowledging the status of privacy as a constitutional right.' 3 4 One federal court noted that "a majority of
courts considering the question had concluded that a constitutional right of confidentiality is implicated by disclosure of a
'3 5
broad range of personal information."'
The federal courts have become conversant with the psychological dimensions of HIV testing and the disclosure of a positive
test result. Recognizing the attendant harms, they have consistently refused to grant routine status to such testing.1' 3 Federal
courts in recent prisoner privacy cases and in cases involving
fourth amendment issues have shown a sophisticated apprecia7
tion of the risks of carelessness with HIV testing.'
The prison cases exemplify judicial recognition of the primacy of a right of privacy in the judicial balancing of a privacy
right against countervailing state interests. By virtue of their incarceration, prisoners admittedly have forfeited a variety of
rights. However, prisoners do retain significant rights, and federal courts have been respectful of inmates' privacy interests in
HIV results. The courts have balanced prison interests against
132. Id. at 318-20.
133. Id. at 318 n.16.
134. See, e.g., Kimberlin v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 788 F.2d 434, 438
(7th Cir.) (constitutional interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters not
denied, 478
applicable to prison inmate within routine use of Privacy Act), cert.
U.S. 1009 (1986); Fadjo v. Coon, 633 F.2d 1172, 1175 (5th Cir. 1981) (right to
privacy found to exist where state attorney releases information told to him in
confidence); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d
Cir. 1980) (court identified right to privacy and need for notice in employee
medical records); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1127-28 (5th Cir. 1978)
(upheld financial disclosure for elected officials because right of privacy does not
include financial privacy), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979); Borucki v. Ryan, 658
F. Supp. 325, 327-30 (D. Mass. 1986) (constitutional right to privacy protects
information in court-ordered psychological report), rev'd, 827 F.2d 836 (1st Cir.
1987).
135. Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 846 (1st Cir. 1987).
136. See Pine, Speculation and Reality: The Role of Facts in Judicial Protection of
Fundamental Rights, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 655, 657 (1988) ("[J]udicial protection of
fundamental rights is facilitated by proof of and reliance upon the facts underlying constitutional determinations.").
137. See, e.g., Doe v. Coughlin, 697 F. Supp. 1234 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (involuntary transfer of HIV-positive inmates to separate cell blocks violates inmates'
right of privacy); Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (right to
privacy is retained despite incarceration and extends to inmate's test results).
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privacy interests in a way that grants substantial deference to prisoner privacy regarding medical information. In Woods v. White, I""
for example, the District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin considered a case where prison medical service personnel
had disclosed to nonmedical staff and other inmates the fact that
an inmate had tested positive for AIDS."'! The court found that
the right of privacy extended to the inmate's test results because a
prisoner "retains his right to privacy, although he is incarcerated.
The right to privacy is not terminated by conviction for a
crime." 14 1 The court noted that such a privacy right is usually
balanced on a case-by-case basis against the government's interest in limited disclosure, stating:
Given the most publicized aspect of the AIDS disease, namely that it is related more closely than most diseases to sexual activity and intravenous drug use, it is
difficult to argue that information about this disease is
not information of the most personal kind, or that an individual would not have an interest in protecting against
the dissemination of such information. I find that plaintiff has a constitutional right to privacy in his medical
records.,4

In Woods, the government could assert no adequate governmental
2
interest in disclosure.
In Doe v. Coughlin,'14 3 inmates who had tested positive for HIV
challenged a program requiring their compulsory assignment to
an AIDS dormitory, asking only that placement be voluntary. The
class plaintiff asserted a "right to privacy in preventing the nonconsensual disclosure of his medical diagnosis and that of the
other class members."' 14 4 The court granted an injunction
prohibiting further implementation of the involuntary transfer
program. The district court balanced the desire of inmates to
control their secrets of HIV seropositivity against the penologic
'4

objectives of the government.

45

The court's analysis of the privacy right, based on Whalen,
138. 689 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Wis. 1988).
139. Id.

140. Id. at 876.
141. Id. (citation omitted).
142. Id.

143. 697 F. Supp. 1234 (N.D.N.Y. 1988).
144. Id. at 1237.
145. Id. at 1236.
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stressed the linkage between AIDS stigma and an individual's
need to control information about it. The court stated:
Each is fully aware that he is infected with a disease
which at the present time has inevitably proven fatal. In
the court's view there are few matters of a more personal
nature, and there are few decisions over which a, person
could have a greater desire to exercise control, than the
manner in which he reveals that diagnosis to others. An
individual's decision to tell family members as well as the
general community that he is suffering from an incurable
disease, particularly one such as AIDS, is clearly an emotional and sensitive one fraught with serious implications
for that individual.146
Furthermore, the court sought to protect the inmates from
potential harms not only while in prison, but also after their release. Again the court in Coughlin noted:
[O]nce the prisoner leaves the prison, he should be burdened with only those residual scars imprisonment must
inflict. The threat to family life and the "emotional enrichment [gained] from close ties with others," is quite
real when an AIDS victim's diagnosis is revealed. Ignorance and prejudice concerning the disease are widespread; the decision of whether, or how, or when to risk
familial and communal opprobrium and even ostracism
47
is one of fundamental importance.
The court, therefore, concluded that prisoners are entitled to
some protection against non-consensual disclosure of their
diagnoses.
In civil cases, where plaintiffs have acquired HIV-positive status through blood transfusions and have sought the identity of
the blood donor or release of information about HIV status, the
courts have been solicitous of HIV status and the need to protect
secrets. In the case of Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Center v. District
Court of Denver,'4 8 a patient who had become infected with the
146. Id. at 1237. The court quoted Justice Stevens' observation that "the
concept of privacy embodies the 'moral fact that a person belongs to himself and
not others nor to society as a whole.' " Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 777 n.5 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Fried, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 288-89 (1977)).
147. Coughdin, 697 F. Supp. at 1238 (citalion omitted).
148. 763 P.2d 1003 (Colo. 1988).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1989

29

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 5 [1989], Art. 4
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34: p. 823

AIDS virus after receiving a transfusion of blood supplied by a
blood center sued the center for negligence. The plaintiff sought
discovery of the identity of each of the blood donors. The court
held that while the donors had a right of privacy, the patient's
interest in obtaining the information outweighed the donors' privacy interests, stating:
[T]he donor has a privacy interest in remaining anonymous and avoiding the embarrassment and potential humiliation of being identified as an AIDS carrier. Belle
Bonfils, and society as a whole, have an interest in maintaining the availability of an abundant supply of volunteer blood for distribution to numerous hospitals. These
interests must be weighed against K.W.'s and C.W.'s
rights to the disclosure of all information necessary to
pursue their claims. 149

The court thus seemed to exalt the rights of plaintiffs to full discovery over a strong privacy interest of the donors. It should be
noted, however, that the court did impose an elaborate system of
judicial safeguards to avoid unnecessary disclosure of donor
identity. 1510
Other courts have drawn the line in civil cases much more
sharply to preclude disclosure. In Doe v. Prime Health/Kansas City,
Inc.,1 51 a health maintenance organization was enjoined from dis-

closing the results of a man's AIDS test to his ex-wife. The relevant facts that justified blocking disclosure were that "John Doe
has declared that he will not have sexual relations with Jane Doe
in the future" and that "the risk of [HIV] exposure from nonsexual, daily contact with persons infected with the . . . virus is so

insignificant that separating HIV carriers from others is not
justified." 152
In another case, Doe v. University of Cincinnati' 5 3 the court reviewed a discovery order of the identity of a blood donor at the
request of a plaintiff who had contracted AIDS through a transfusion. The court followed the reasoning of Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Service,

Inc. , 54

in which the Florida Supreme Court held,

149. Id. at 1012.

150. Id. at 1013-14.
151. No. 88-C-5149, slip op. (Oct. 18, 1988).
152. Id. (quoted in Doctor Doctor Gimmee the News: HAlO Cant Release AIDS
Residts, A.B.A. J. Jan. 1989, at 84).
153. 42 Ohio App. 3d 227, 538 N.E.2d 419 (1988).
154. 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987).
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based on a right of privacy, that a plaintiff's interests in discovery
were less important than those of blood donors in remaining
anonymous.
A wide range of secrets carrying varying weight in terms of
their informational privacy value may be implicated in HIV testing. One type of secret a patient may wish to keep is the fact of
his HIV status. The patient may know that he has tested positive,
but may not want this information to be disclosed to the world at
large. The individual might fear employment retaliation, loss of
housing or insurance. However, the patient may be exposing sexual partners to contagion by concealing his condition. Secrets are
double-edged: to treat them as inviolate is to allow the holder to
protect himself while at the same time to risk deceiving those
around him. How can a health care provider protect against the
risk that a patient might have such a secret? The solution is for
the health care institution to impose a policy that assumes that
any patient might have good reasons for secrecy and to act accordingly. The alternative is to force disclosure and thereby invade the patient's privacy. Because privacy is not absolute, we
justify limited invasions of privacy in many contexts when compelling interests are at stake. However, the right of privacy requires
a substantial justification before it can be breached. A bald assertion of the public good alone should not be sufficient.
A second category of secrets is created if the medical staff is
allowed to test patients without their consent. The medical staff
now has a secret-the results of an HIV test-not known by the
patient. The consequences of having such a staff secret are
double-edged. If the test result is disclosed to the patient, it will
cause the patient distress for two reasons. First, the patient will
know her HIV status, which, if positive, can lead to substantial
personal grief, depression and even suicide. Second, the patient's
autonomy as well as her trust in the health care institution has
been violated by the surreptitious testing for HIV.
However, if the test result is not disclosed to the patient, then
the medical staff may owe an obligation to third parties who may
come into contact with this HIV-positive patient. To what extent
is a health care provider obligated to disclose this secret? To
whom must it be disclosed? A spouse? Sexual partners, whomever they might be? What are the risks of doing nothing except
using the information to protect those working within the health
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.Having chosen to unveil the secret, the re-

sponsibility for dealing with its consequences now shifts to the
health care provider, making him answerable to third parties.
A third secret may be generated not, or not solely, for staff
protection but to satisfy epidemiologists. Epidemiologists favor
broad-based prevalence studies which provide as much information as possible to enable them to accurately track the incidence
and spread of AIDS. 15 6 Thus, mandatory testing with reporting
of positive HIV results to a central registry would greatly advance
epidemiological research. 5 7 Curran and other public health lawyers have objected to such reporting and data collection in that it
has limited epidemiological value and raises confidentiality issues.' 58 An additional objection may be raised that such testing
for the purpose of collecting data violates strong national norms
against research on human subjects without their consent. Such
data collection, after all, is to further the goals of a national experiment in disease tracking. Each person from whom blood is
drawn would thus be a human subject entitled to the considera51
tion we grant to any research subject. 1
A fourth category of secret involves individuals who suspect
that they have been exposed to the HIV virus. Suppose an individual is anxious about what a positive result might mean, but is
inclined to be tested and needs some advice about what comes
next. He has a profound distrust of institutions, having had unfavorable experiences in the past. Can he trust the health care institutions with which he might have contact? Will they keep results
to themselves? The self-protective and thoughtless institutional
attitude evidenced by willingness to test anyone's blood without
consent demonstrates a lack of respect for the person. Realistic
155. Klein, A Health Care Dilemma: Testing Patientsfor 1l1[', 21 J. HEALTH &
Hosp. L. 249 (1988).
156. This is often advocated, since the importance of tracking the disease is
clear. For a discussion of' the need for epidemiological research, see Doll, A
Proposalfor Doing Prevalence Studies of AIDS, 294 BRIT. MED. J. 244 (1987).
157. For a critical discussion of such proposals, see Curran, Clark & Gostin,
AIDS: Legal and Policy Implications of the Application of Traditional Disease Control
Measures, 15 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 27, 29 (1987).
158. Id.
159. The regulations on federal research involving human subjects are
found at 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (198 1) and cover "(5) Research involving the collection or study of existing data, documents, records, pathological specimens, or
diagnostic specimens." Id. Section 46.116, General Requirements for Informed
Consent, provides that "no investigator may involve a human being as a subject
in research covered by these regulations unless the investigator has obtained the
legally effective informed consent of the subject." Id. § 46.116.
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concerns about the mishandling of test results may deter significant numbers of individuals from seeking medical attention.
Those deterred may be precisely those who most desperately
need to know and to be counseled. 160
C.

The Principle of Reasonableness: Balancing on a Weighted Scale

A test of reasonableness is the foundation for further analysis
once a duty or a constitutional right of privacy has been found.
What is gained and what is lost by nonconsensual testing? The
burden lies with the proponent of an invasive and potentially
harmful approach to provide justifications adequate to override
powerful individual rights. The justification of preserving the
public health usually satisfies the minimum threshold of a compelling state interest. Once this threshold requirement is met, the
court will closely scrutinize the objectives considering whether
the institutional ends justify the means.'"' Testing blood samples
of a suspected HIV-positive individual must therefore be justified
by significant reasons before a defendant in a tort case can avoid
liability, and before governmental action can mandate such testing. The privacy interests of the individual are important and
powerful interests that deserve substantial protection in the face
2
of miscalculated risks, medical biases and risks of stigma."
1. Constitutional Balancing.- Mandatory Testing as a Fourth
Amendment Violation
Blood testing is not a trivial intrusion. In fact, federal courts
have found the taking and testing of body fluids to constitute a
160. See Hermann & DeWolfe, IH'Antibody Testing Without Patient'sInformed
Consent: Illinois Abandons Patients' Rights, 21 J. HEALTH & Hosp. L. 263 (1988).
HIV antibody testing can lead to a medical record notation which reports the
positive HIV antibody test. Since those who are HIV positive report discrimination in housing, employment, insurance and access to health care, anonymous
testing has been sought by anxiotis people. Most commentators have concluded
that testing should only occur with counseling, informed consent and assurances
of confidentiality of the results. For a discussion of voluntary testing, confidentiality and informed decisionmaking, see INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NAT'L ACADEMY
OF SCIENCES, CONFRONTING AIDS 15, 122-26 (1986); AIDS TASK GROUP OF THE
AM. ACADEMY OF
LAW:

Hosp.

ATrORNEYS OF THE AM.

HosP. Assoc., AIDS AND
14-15 (1988).

THE

RESPONDING TO THE SPECIAL CONCERNS OF HOSPITALS

161. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 633 (1969) (classification of individuals allowed to vote for school board must be tailored so that
exclusion of class denied right is necessary to achieve state goal).
162. Note, The Constitutional Rights of AIDS Carriers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1274
(1986) (legislators should support testing, education and research rather than
restrictions).
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search and seizure under the fourth amendment." 3 Government
testing of body fluids, therefore, requires a second level of judicial scrutiny in which the government justifies its actions with reference to a compelling interest. "Particularized suspicion"
traditionally has been held to be essential before testing is allowed. However, in two recent cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has
allowed employee privacy interests in the workplace setting to be
outweighed by "special needs" of the state. In Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives' Association 164 and in National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab,'"35 the Court held various modes of invasive
testing, including breath, urine and blood tests, to be a "search"
within the meaning of the fourth amendment. In Skinner, the
Court concluded that the compelling governmental interest in
railroad safety outweighed the tests' limited intrusion upon the
privacy interests of employees in the "pervasively" regulated railroad industry. The testing of railway workers was to be limited to
post-accident testing of workers in safety-sensitive jobs. Testing
without either a warrant or an individualized suspicion was therefore held to be reasonable under the fourth amendment. This
"special needs" balancing analysis creates an exception to probable cause searches of the human body unsupported by any evidence of wrongdoing.'"11 As Justice Marshall, joined by Justice
Brennan, wrote in dissent: "[T]he majority substitutes a manipulable balancing inquiry, under which, upon the mere assertion of
a 'special need,' even the deepest dignitary and privacy interests
become vulnerable to governmental incursion."'1 7 The privacy
rights of employees in Skinner are narrowed in the face of concerns about railroad accidents and employee drug abuse. However, the Court did emphasize the pervasively-regulated industry
aspect of the railroad business, so that this encroachment into the
core of fourth amendment protections may, for the present, be
restrained.
The lower courts, in the specific context of HIV testing of
government employees, have been reluctant to narrow fourth
163. See Railway Labor Executives Assoc. v.Burnley, 839 F.2d 575 (9th Cir.
1988) (search and seizure of urine for testing is similar to blood testing, thus
granted, 108 S. Ct. 2033 (1988); Mcneed warrant absent reasonableness), cert.
Donell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987) (urinalysis is search and seizure
within meaning of fourth amendment); Tucker v. Dickey, 613 F. Supp. 1124

(W.D. Wis. 1985) (urinalyses and body cavity searches equally degrading).
164. 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
165. 109 S. Ct. 1384 (1989).
166. Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1423.

167. Id. at 1425.
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amendment requirements. In Glover v. Eastern Nebraska Community
Office of Retardation,1 18 the policy of the Eastern Nebraska Human
Services Agency (ENCOR) requiring certain employees to submit
to mandatory testing and reporting for tuberculosis, hepatitis B
and HIV was attacked on fourth amendment grounds. ENCOR
clients, many of whom were retarded, were sometimes violent,
and staff members occasionally had been bitten or scratched.
Testing was targeted at staff with extensive client contact. One
staff member had died of AIDS.'!!
The federal district court noted the level of false positives
from the HIV test, particularly in low prevalence areas such as
7
Nebraska, 77) examined the medical reasons for HIV testing,' '
and concluded that testing in isolation as provided in ENCOR's
policy did not serve these purposes. The court noted: "The reaction of patients to [HIV test results] is devastation. If not handled
properly, it can lead to disastrous results, including suicide. Because of the foreboding message that accompanies a positive HIV
test result, some people simply do not want to know if they are
infected."' 7 2 The court further noted that "the risk of transmission of the AIDS virus . . .in the ENCOR environment is ex-

tremely low, approaching zero" and concluded that "the risk of
transmission of the HIV virus at ENCOR is minuscule at best and
will have little, if any, effect in preventing the spread of HIV or in
1 73
protecting the clients."
The court held that the fourth amendment applied, and that
mandatory blood testing constituted an unreasonable search and
seizure given a low risk of infection to the clients. The court, in
the balancing process, then considered the virtues of testing:
Although the pursuit of a safe work environment for
employees and a safe training and living environment for
all clients is a worthy one, the policy does not reasonably
serve that purpose. There is simply no real basis to be
168. 686 F. Supp. 243 (D. Neb. 1988), aft'd, 867 F.2d 461 (8th Cir. 1989).
169. Id. at 247.
170. "Thus the percentage of false positives in a low prevalence community
will be much higher than in a high prevalence community." Id. at 248.
171. The court noted the following reasons: "(a) as an adjunct to the medi-

cal workup of a patient who may be infected, (b) for epidemiological purposes to
establish the level of infection in a community, and (c) as a device used in conjunction with counseling those in high risk groups to stimulate them to change

their high-risk behaviors." Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 249.
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concerned that clients are at risk of contracting the AIDS
virus at the work place. These clients are not in danger
of contracting the AIDS virus from staff members and
such an unreasonable fear cannot justify a policy which
intrudes on staff members' constitutionally protected
rights. 174

Other courts have taken a more restrictive view of the rights
of an employee vis-a-vis institutional interests in testing. In Plowman v. United States Department of the Army, 175 the district court dismissed a suit brought against a supervisor of a civilian employee
of the Department of the Army, who had tested HIV-positive in a
nonconsensual test conducted by Army doctors and had then
been forced to resign. The case involved issues of qualified immunity of a government employee in the face of unclear constitutional law in the areas of both privacy and the fourth
amendment.' 7" The court noted the split among the courts of

appeals and the lack of a definitive statement by the Supreme

77
Court articulating the limits of a constitutional right to privacy. 1
Despite this uncertainty, the Plowman court concluded that in the
very special context of the military, and of command decisions at
78
foreign bases, the balance favored the government. 1

The court also considered the fourth amendment issues arising in the case. The court used the remoteness of causation to
avoid deciding whether the fourth amendment protects against
nonconsensual HIV testing, since the supervisor had not ratified
the testing. 17 The court argued that the extension of the fourth
amendment to an AIDS test "is far from clear."' 8 1 The invasion
by HIV testing was not intrusive since the blood sample "had already been extracted for the purposes of other, arguably consensual diagnostic tests; no further extractions or intrusions were
necessary."''
Further, Army surgeons had a "medical need to
know" the patient's HIV status if surgery ever became neces174. Id. at 251.
175. 698 F. Supp. 627 (E.D. Va. 1988).
176. Id. at 633.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 636.
179. Id. at 635-36.
180. Id. at 636.
181. Id. (court found intrusion significantly less than required to evoke
fourth amendment protection and questioned whether there was any intrusion
at all since blood tested had been extracted for other purposes).
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sary. 1'12 The court cited no testimony to suggest what the surgeons would have done differently if they had this information or
whether they would follow CDC universal precautions as a matter
of practice in all cases.' 813 In support, the court cited two recent
decisions which upheld the use of a person's blood sample for an
HIV test provided "that the sample was already required for a
'1
series of other diagnostic tests."'

4

The Plowman court treated HIV testing as merely another
harmless diagnostic procedure with no psychological or other
repercussions to the patient or to third parties. This approach
reflects unthinking judicial deference to very modest government
justifications. 8 5 The court noted that "AIDS is a fatal, infectious
disease; it is not a political or constitutional status. AIDS does
not ...

confer on its victims any greater constitutional rights than

are possessed by victims of other infectious or fatal maladies, such
as herpes, tuberculosis, or cancer.' ' 8 6 Yet the court also noted
that "AIDS may provoke heightened reactions among people, especially in foreign countries. This reaction could be a factor pertinent to the constitutional calculus where, as here, a right is not
absolute and balancing is required." 8 7 Plowman is a case plagued
with inconsistency in which the military context has loaded the
scales against the individual. Even here the court struggled to
sort out the weight to be given to the stigma of AIDS in balancing
the respective rights and interests of the parties.
2.

Private Law: The Threat of Tort Actions

In the private arena, where constitutional constraints do not
apply to the actions of private actors and institutions, the reasonableness principle of tort law is combined with a judicial inclina182. Id. (court suggested that even if fourth amendment analyses were ap-

plied, purpose of testing was compelling).
183. Interestingly, the court commented in a footnote that there was no
evidence that justified the army doctors' failure to inform the plaintiff of the
reasons for the HIV test. "Given the circumstances, the physicians should have

given plaintiff notice of the test. Their failure to do so, however, is irrelevant to
the issues at bar." Id. at 636 n.27.
184. Id. at 636-37 (citing United States v. City & County of San Francisco,
No. 84-7089, slip op. (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 1987); Local 1812, Am. Fed'n of Gov't
Employees v. United States Dep't of State, 662 F. Supp. 50 (D.D.C. 1987)).
185. The court noted, but declined to resolve, the issue of whether HIV

testing was a routine feature of diagnostic blood tests and whether the plaintiff
had therefore consented to the HIV test by consenting to the withdrawal of
blood generally. Id. at 629 n.6.

186. Id. at 632 n.20.
187. Id.
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tion to protect individual autonomy in medical decision making.
Given the possible pernicious consequences of blood testing of
suspected HIV-positive individuals, courts seem likely to impose a
stringent burden on defendants where plaintiffs are in fact
injured.
Suppose that a hospital has a policy of routine testing. As we
have seen, many health care providers would like the right to test
without the patient's permission. If the Minnesota study previously cited"' is representative of hospital practice around the
country, then some of these tests will be improperly read, errors
in record keeping for the blood samples will occur and staff confusion about the meaning of positives may result. Thus, the potential for tort liability is great.
a.

Existing Tort Theories

Errors in testing can result in a large damage claim. If a patient who tests positive is mistakenly interpreted as HIV-positive
even though a follow-up test is negative, or an HIV-seropositive
patient is misdiagnosed as having AIDS, the resulting mental distress of that patient may be compensable in a tort suit. Given the
nature of AIDS, such distress is presently foreseeable to a physician.8 : A false or erroneous test result may trigger "AIDS anxiety" with debilitating effects on a patient rendering a health care
worker liable. I""° Overly broad testing by health care workers to
alleviate their own anxieties about exposure to AIDS will do little
to calm them, while exposing them to tremendously increased potential for tort suits. Patients are put at risk unnecessarily as are
medical staffs.
Failure to Counsel. Even if an unconsented test result accurately identifies the patient as HIV-positive and the patient is notified, a cause of action may still exist for the distress caused by the
news. Given the policy statements of a variety of professional and
governmental organizations, the failure to provide pre-test counseling, rendering the patient poorly prepared for the news of HIV
positivity, is itself a negligent act. If counseling is not done at all,
or is performed poorly, given a vulnerable patient, then the possi188. Henry, supra note 19.
189. See, e.g., Holland & Tross, The PsYchosocial and Aeuropsychiatic Sequelae of

the ,4quired immunodeficienc , Syndrome and Related Disorders, 103
MED. 760 (1985).

ANNALS INTERNAL

190. See the damages alleged in Doe v. Wills Eye Hospital, No. Civ. 5248
(C.P.Philadelphia County Mar. 30, 1989) discussed at supra note 115.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol34/iss5/4

38

Furrow: AIDS and the Health Care Provider: The Argument for Voluntary HIV

1989]

HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS AND

HIV

TESTING

861

bility of liability for the patient's mental distress is arguable. 19
Failure to Diagnose. If the testing is clandestine, with the patient not notified, and the results are true positive, then a diagnosis is missed that could have led to positive medical action at the
early stages of seropositivity. The courts' reactions to such a situation have been quite consistent: compensation has been
awarded for any mental distress and psychic injury suffered by the
patient and also for the "loss of a chance" of treatment because of
the missed diagnosis. 9 2 As evidence accumulates as to the effectiveness of treatments such as AZT in extending the lives of AIDS
patients, or in delaying the onset of symptoms of AIDS once a
person is HIV-positive, or in preventing seropositivity after exposure to the virus, failure to inform patients will increase health
care provider liability risks.
It is precisely in the case where the test is done surreptitiously and the results not disclosed to the patient that the greatest harm can be done to both the patient and to third parties. A
chance is lost both to warn and to treat.
Negligent Testing. A surreptitious test for staff protection, for
example, doing a single ELISA test on a patient's blood, poses a
significant risk of being erroneous. Standard procedure is a second ELISA, followed by a Western Blot test. If the single test
reveals a false positive and the results are somehow revealed to
others, as they are likely to be, the patient might suffer economic
injury and personal psychological and other harms. The health
care provider is ultimately liable for revealing such information
and causing these results.
Duties to Warn Third Parties. There is an interesting twist to
overzealous testing and the increase in the risk of suit. If a patient
is offered a test after proper pre-test counseling, and declines,
then the health care worker does not have information about the
presence of the HIV virus in that patient. The obligation of the
191. See, e.g., Rowe v. Bennett, 514 A.2d 802 (Me. 1986) (vulnerable psychi-

atric patient); Newton v. Kaiser Hosp., 184 Cal. App. 3d 386, 228 Cal. Rptr. 890
(1986) (contractual relationship may form basis of recovery for negligent infliction of mental distress).

192. See Chappell v. Master, 255 So. 2d 546 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971) (failure to communicate to prospective adopting parents that child was affected with

fatal hydrocephalus held actionable), cert. denied, 260 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 1972);
Hofmann v. Blackmon, 241 So. 2d 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (duty to cor-

rectly diagnose and also to inform members of family of patient with contagious
disease and steps to reduce contagion), cert. denied, 245 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1971);
Fosgate v. Corona, 66 N.J. 268, 330 A.2d 355 (1974) (duty to correctly diagnose
to reduce spread of infection).
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health care provider stops there. Any obligation to third parties
shifts to the individual to take precautions and to test later. At a
minimum, pre-test counseling will have sensitized the patient to
the risks of the HIV virus. If, however, the provider tests a patient's blood and the test is positive, then must that provider warn
the patient? The provider now has information that can lead to
injury to others if they are not informed. If the provider does not
inform the patient and does not explain how to minimize harm to
third parties through safe sex and sterile needles, then an infected
third party has a suit against the provider. This obligation to
warn third parties, derived from the California Supreme Court's
decision in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California,193 may
194
extend even further the risks of nonconsensual testing.
The common law duty to warn, articulated in Tarasoff and
other cases, intersects with state statutory requirements to report
HIV infection to state authorities. Statements by various profes-t
sional organizations often are in disagreement over the duty of
health care professionals. Such statements sometimes assume
that all obligations to warn are satisfied by reporting to state
agencies

rather than undertaking the responsibility directly.

However, this will be the case only where the state has a special
statute addressing the duty to report. 19 5 Some organizations such
as the Infectious Disease Society of America recommend that if
the HIV-positive patient refuses to tell others of his status, the
physician should then consider his duty to the patient's contacts:
"It is clear that, under some circumstances, the duty to inform
1
will take precedence over the duty to protect confidentiality." 9
Under certain circumstances, where the physician has counseled
the patient and is still convinced that the HIV-positive individual
is likely to deliberately have risky contacts with others who are
17
unaware of the risk, he may have a duty to warn.
193. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976) (when psychotherapist determines patient presents serious danger of violence, he incurs obligation to use reasonable care to ensure safety of intended victim).
194. See Eth, The Sexually Active, HIV Infected Patient: Confidentiality versus the
Duty to Protect, 18 PSYCHIATRIc ANNALS 571, 575 (1988) (discussing duty to warn

if patient has documented positive HIV test).
195. For a good discussion of the problem, see Closen & Isaacman, The
Duty to Notify Piivate Third Parties of the Risks of Hil Infection, 21 J. HEALTH & HosP.

L. 295 (1988).
196. Health & Pub. Policy Comm., Am. College of Physicians & the Infectious Diseases Soc'y of Am., The Acquired Immunodeficiencv Syndrome (AIDS) and Infection with the Human Immunodeficiencv Virus (11i'), 108 ANNALS INTERNAL MED.

460, 466 (1988).
197. "Whether a physician has a duty to warn is not clear, but such a duty
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The Emergence of a Standard of Care

As early as in Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital 1118 and as recently as in Jackson v. Power, 9 9 state courts have
measured the conduct of health care institutions by reference to
existing private and governmental guidelines and standards, at
times imposing liability directly on an institution that fails to com20 0
ply with external standards.
Routine screening for HIV, if considered at all, should follow
guidelines of the CDC.20 l Since the CDC has established a standard, failure of a health care worker or institution to follow that
standard risks tort liability.2z° 2 The CDC does not recommend
such routine screening and questions its value in most cases. If
screening of patient blood is to be done on a routine basis, however, the CDC proposes that the patient's consent be obtained
and that patients be informed of test results and counseled by
properly trained counselors. CDC guidelines further stress the
need for confidentiality safeguards to limit knowledge of test results to those directly involved in the care of infected patients, or
as required by law; and require assurances that identification of
infected patients will not lead to denial or limitation of needed
care. The CDC noted that routine testing, even with the above
may arise when a patient indicates his intention to engage in sexual activity with a
particular person which makes transmission of the disease likely." Hermann,
supra note 100, at 74.
198. 33 Il. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965) (state hospital regulations, national hospital accreditation standards, and bylaws of hospital are relevant but
denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
not conclusive), cert.
199. 743 P.2d 1376 (Alaska 1987) (under doctrine of corporate negligence,
hospital owes duty to its patients to use reasonable care to ensure physicians are
competent).
200. The corporate negligence cases include: Fridena v. Evans, 127 Ariz.
516, 622 P.2d 463 (1980) (hospital as corporation may be held liable for negligent supervision); Purcell v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d 335 (1972)
(failure of hospital to take action against surgeon who lacked adequate skills
constitutes negligence on part of hospital); Felice v. St. Agnes Hosp., 65 A.D.2d
388, 411 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1978) (hospital can be held liable for treatment of patients assigned by doctors who are not hospital employees because every doctor
using hospital's facilities must comply with its standards); Bost v. Riley, 44 N.C.
App. 638, 262 S.E.2d 391 (hospital may be held liable if breach of duty to monidenied, 300 N.C. 194, 269
tor treatment was contributor) factor to injury), cert.
S.E.2d 621 (1980); Pedroza v. Bryant, 101 Wash. 2d 226, 677 P.2d 166 (1984)
(doctrine of corporate negligence imposes on hospital a nondelegable duty
owed directly to patients).
201. Recommendations, supra note 53, at 13S-15S.
202. See generallV Hermann & Gorman, Hospital Liability and AIDS Treatment:
The .Veedfor a National Standard of Care, 20 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 441 (1987) (CDC
guidelines provide most appropriate basis for establishing national standard of'
care in AIDS treatment).
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safeguards, should be constantly evaluated for its effectiveness in
protecting health care workers and its effect on patients.
IV.

THE INSTITUTION AS TRUSTEE: THE PROPER LOCUS FOR
SAFER ALTERNATIVES

The central actor is often ignored in the policy debates over
AIDS testing, with sides drawn between medical staff and patients. Yet, the lesson from both the informed consent doctrine
and judicial balancing tests in constitutional privacy cases is that
the institutional interest in routine HIV testing or another potentially harmful policy must consider alternatives to that policy.
Thus, if the purpose of widespread routine testing of patients is
to protect staff, one must first evaluate alternatives that create a
lesser risk to patients while adequately protecting staff.

The health care institution, whether a hospital or clinic, is the
central actor in protecting both patients and staff. It establishes
policies, buys medical equipment, admonishes staff, faces liability
hazards for improper acts and insures staff against health and dis-

ability consequences. An institution has the capacity to develop
safeguards to ensure the safety of its staff which provide alternatives to routine testing and which better protect both staff and
patients.

A.

Protecting Staff

1. Limiting Individual Exposure
Institutions can track employee exposure to patient fluids
and limit the staff's occupational exposure to the HIV virus. Lim-

iting exposure occurs at several levels. For example, it may be
that the surgical staff in some hospitals faces a risk of exposure
that might be deemed "excessive." A surgeon in an emergency
room, performing invasive procedures that result in needle stick
injuries might be protected by spreading the risk so that no one
person faces an unduly high level of exposure. The institution
could further develop a policy reducing certain elective procedures, and "reducing the number of patients with AIDS treated
by a single physician by requiring other competent physicians to
treat them."2 -

3

Where it is reasonably certain that a subset of

health care personnel is facing high levels of exposure, it is the
duty of the institution to search for ways to reduce this risk and to
dissipate it.
203. Emanuel, supra note 37, at 1688.
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Ensuring Implementation of Proper Precautions
The Occupational Safety and Health Act 20 4 requires that

each employer furnish each employee a work place "free from
recognized hazards . . .likely to cause death or serious physical
harm. ' '12 5 The Occupational Safety and Health Administration

(OSHA) is preparing new detailed regulations to govern AIDS in
the workplace.

2 6
11

Late in 1988, OSHA issued enforcement pro-

cedures for occupational exposure to HIV and hepatitis B
(HBV). 20 7 These guidelines are to provide "uniform inspection
procedures and guidelines to be followed in conducting inspections and issuing citations under pertinent standards for health
care workers potentially exposed to HBV and HIV."21111 The pro-

cedures focus on universal blood and bodily fluid precautions to
be used for all patients whenever there is a risk of exposure to
blood or other bodily fluids or tissues. The OSHA guidelines
note that "OSHA is relying on these guidelines as reflecting an
appropriate and widely recognized and accepted standard of protection to be followed by health care employers."

2

1111

The focus of

OSHA surveys of health care institutions will be "emergency
rooms, operating rooms, direct patient care areas, laboratories,
and X-ray. Secondary areas of concern are laundry and housekeeping. " 2

1

In citing hazards, inspectors will apply OSHA re-

quirements wherever employees are expected to have direct
contact with body fluids, whether or not a patient is known or
2 1
even suspected to have been infected with hepatitis B or HIV. ''

OSHA has begun to conduct surveys under these new enforcement guidelines, focusing on health care facilities in states
with the largest numbers of hepatitis B and HIV infection
204. 29 U.S.C. § 654 (1982).
205. Id. § 654(a)(1).
206. See Occupational Safety & Health Admin., Occupational Exposure to

Blood Borne Pathogens: Proposed Rule and Notice of Hearing, 54 Fed. Reg.
102 at 23,042 (1989) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1910) (proposed May 30,
1989).
207. U.S.

DEP'T

OF

LABOR,

ASSISTANT

SAFETY & HEALTH, OSHA INSTRUCTION

SECRETARY

FOR

OCCUPATIONAL

CPL 2-2.44A (Aug. 15, 1988).

208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.132 (1986) (Personal protective equipment); id.
§ 1910.22(a)(1), (a)(2) (Housekeeping); id. § 1910.141(a)(4)(i), (ii) (Sanitation,
Waste Disposal); id. § 1910.145(0) (specifications for accident prevention signs
and tags); see also 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1982) (duties of employers and
employees).
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cases.2 12 OSHA inspectors have cited over eighty health care facilities during the past year for failure to protect workers from
AIDS and other diseases. Facilities cited had failed to require that
laboratory or health care workers wear protective gloves or had
permitted reuse of disposable gloves; had failed to dispose of
used needles properly; or had failed to educate workers. 2 3 It is
clear that health care institutions can improve their procedures
for protecting workers in line with OSHA requirements.
3.

Educating Staff

A medical staff should be knowledgeable about the various
modes of transmission and actual risks of contagion; however,
this knowledge is often lacking. The Report of the President's
Commission on the HIV Epidemic urged: "Employers should develop an HIV education program for all employees [that] . . .
should emphasize two goals: information about transmission to
prevent the further spread of HIV infection and education about
legal issues-such as how to ensure confidentiality and prevent
discrimination.' '214
4.

GuaranteeingBenefits

Health care workers will still have serious fears even if OSHA
requirements are satisfied and staff education improved. These
fears relate to practical concerns about job security for an employee who seroconverts, or disability and health insurance coverage or payment for prophylactic AZT if the worker is stuck by a
needle. The financial risks for the health care worker are serious
if the institution does not provide generous benefits. As one
writer has argued:
Not to provide such financial protection sends a message
that society expects health care workers to care for patients with HIV but is unwilling to back that expectation
with direct support for the health care workers themselves. Such a program would somewhat ameliorate the
212. See Kadzielski, 0SHA Issues New AIDS Enforcement Guidelines For Hospital
Sinveys, 3 HEALTH CARE L. NEWSL. (Dec. 1988).
213. Mayer, OSHA Cites 80 Health Facilities for Inferior Disease Safeguards, 2
HEALTIIWEEK 8 (1988).
214. REPORT OF TilE PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N ON TIE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC,.JUNE 24, at 125 (1988). See also SPECI L COMM.
ON AIDS/HIV INFECTION Poi.icy OF TrilE AMERICAN HosP. Ass'N, AIDS/HIV INFECTION:

RECOMMENIATIONS

FOR HEAI:II CARE PRACTICES

AND PUBLIC POLICY

35-36 (1988).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol34/iss5/4

44

Furrow: AIDS and the Health Care Provider: The Argument for Voluntary HIV

1989]

HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS AND

HIV

TESTING

867

stress arising from concern about HIV infection in the
workplace and would help to maintain a professional approach to the care of patients with HIV by health care
2 15
workers.

B.

Protecting Patients

The institution has an obligation to both the patients and to
the employees. Institutions must consider removing HIV-infected employees from any contact with patients suffering from
easily transmitted diseases. Reasonable accommodations are
often possible that allow an employee to perform her job without
21
endangering patients or herself. 6
Patient consent and adequate pre-test counseling and posttest discussions are critical to achieving the goal of protecting
both patients and third parties. The problem of a patient secretan HIV-positive result-known to the health care provider poses
a difficult legal and ethical problem of a duty to warn. If we keep
in mind, however, the goals of the informed consent doctrine,
treating the patient as part of a collaborative effort to cope with a
medical problem, then a health care provider can be encouraged
to talk with the patient prior to jumping into the legal quagmire
of a duty to warn third parties. As Eth writes: "[S]tandard psychiatric interventions may prove effective. Clarification, interpretation, and suggestion may assist the patient in working through
conflicts over the shame and guilt associated with HIV infections.
With relief of anxiety and depression, patients may become less
resistant to discharging their responsibility to inform partners of
their seropositivity."

21 7

Only after serious efforts have been

made to counsel the HIV-positive patient about his status and the
risks to his partners should an institution consider the obligation
to contact third parties.21x
215. Henry, Do Physicians Have an Obligation to Treat Patients with AIDS?, 320
NEW ENG. J. MED. 120-21 (1989).

216. See generally Gostin, HI'-lifected Physicians and the Practiceof Seriously Invasive Procedures, 19 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 32 (1989); McNeil, Health Care Institutions and HII'-Infected Employees: A Different Set of Problems, 5 HEALTSPAN 8 (1988)
(risk of transmission to patients from employees); Schurgin, The Impact of AIDS

upon Health Care Employers, 21 J. HEALTH & Hosp. L. 285 (1988) (discussion of
precautions and problems of AIDS in health care workers).
217. Eth, supra note 194, at 575.
218. See Closen & Isaacman, supra note 195.
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CONCLUSION

Routine screening in the health care institution performed
simply to relieve staff anxiety must be rejected as standard practice. Such testing without patient consent offends legal and ethical norms. HIV screening can be justified to manage patients, but
not to protect staff. Staff protection is best achieved by a general
practice of using precautions in any situation where medical personnel might come into contact with patient body fluids and by
demanding that the institution, as a trustee of staff safety, invest
time and money in routines, equipment and procedures that will
ensure a higher level of protection for staff. The burden should
be on the institution to protect both staff and patients.
Health care providers should test only with the consent of
the patient. This policy avoids most of the liability hazards and is
consistent with the advice of thoughtful medical commentators,
the recommendations of state hospital and professional associations, and the law of several states. 2 11 Such a policy minimizes
219. See, for example, the Michigan Hospital Association's Model AIDS
Policy, which states:
Given the potential for serious discrimination, all testing should be
voluntary, anonymous, and conducted with informed consent.
Testing for HIV is appropriately performed for the purposes of
making a diagnosis; answering a patient's question about whether he or
she is infected; conducting a follow-up after a potential exposure has
occurred, (e.g. after needlesticks or other inadvertent violation of universal precautions, whether such exposure involves employee exposure
to a patient's blood or body substances or patient exposure to an employee's blood or body substances) or screening blood, organs or other
body substances prior to donation. Routine testing of either patients
or staff should not be used as a means of reducing the risk of exposure
to HIV.
If there are acceptable modifications in invasive procedures that
can further minimize the risk of exposure, ideally they should be incorporated into established practices for all patients in order to afford protection for all patients and staff. However, if there are certain
procedures where specific modifications can be identified which could
not be applied universally but would materially reduce the risk of transmission for the patient or staff (without creating an unacceptable risk
for the patient), then in these cases, limited testing might appropriately
be used to identify which patients would be candidates for the modified
procedures.
l'hen an HII' test is performed for an v reason the informed consent of the
patient should be obtained. Obviously emergency situations may prevent
obtaining informed consent. The physician should obtain the informed
consent from the patient.
All patients should be notified of the results of their HIV test by
the patient's physician. The physician and hospital may arrange for appropriate counseling and follow-up either in the hospital itself or in a
community-based agency for patients whose tests indicate that they
have been infected by the HIV.
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the destructive side effects that inadvertent or intentional
breaches of confidentiality might have on a patient's life.
Hospitals should adhere to FDA approved test procedures and follow CDC approved criteria for determining the presence of HIV infection, both of which establish protocols for repeat and confirmatory
testing.
HIV test results are appropriately used by physicians or hospital
staff in the direction or conduct of the patient's medical care. The delivery of care should not be conditioned on the willingness of a patient
to undergo testing or on the results of a test. Appropriate care should
be delivered to HIV positive patients. Employees or medical staff
members who refuse to treat patients based on the patient's HIV status
may be subject to disciplinary action in accordance with the applicable
hospital's policy and/or collective bargaining agreements, up to and including suspension or termination.
MICHIGAN Hosp. ASS'N, MODEL ACQUIRED IMMUNO DEFICIENCY SYNDROME POL-

icy, 1988, at 3-4 (emphasis added).
The Pennsylvania Hospital Association AIDS Guidelines state:
Testing
I. Routine testing of patients and/or health care workers is not necessary to reduce the risk of exposure to HIV and should not be substituted for rigorous adherence to universal precautions.
Informed Consent
I. When an HIV antibody test is performed for any reasons other than
blind epidemiologic studies to determine HIV prevalence, the specific
written informed consent of the patient should be obtained....
II. Hospitals should designate trained personnel, including physicians, to seek consent and to provide pre- and post-test counseling.
The patient should be presented with the option of discussing the test
further with his/her physician prior to granting consent.
Ill. The explanation (pretest counseling) should include the reasons
for conducting the test, a description of the way(s) in which the test
results could affect the patient's medical regimen, and the personal significance for the patient of the possible results of the test....
IV. Existing law governing informed consent does not require a patient to sign anything, but merely that certain information on risks, nature of procedure, consequences, etc., which a reasonable person in
similar circumstances would want to know in order to make an informed choice be conveyed to the patient. However, if there is subsequently any dispute over whether the information was actually
conveyed to the patient before the test, the hospital will be better able
to defend its liability if the patient has signed a document acknowledging receipt of the information. Documentation in the patient's chart by
the physician would be less likely to resolve a subsequent difference of
opinion as to whether the informed consent explanation was actually
given. Thus, since proving that informed consent was obtained prior to
the procedure could ultimately be as important as obtaining it in the
first place, the most prudent course from a liability defense perspective
would be to have the patient sign a written consent form dealing specifically with the HIV antibody test. (Sample Form A)
V. Release of information pertaining to test results should follow general guidelines for release of information from the medical record.
VI. The patient should be notified of the results of his/her blood test.
HOSPITAL Ass'N OF PENNSYLVANIA, AIDS GUIDELINES FOR HOSPITALS, Feb. 1988,
at 29.
Both of the guidelines are contained in NATIONAL Ass'N OF SOCIAL WORK-
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The recommendations of Searle and others are relevant here:
"[T]hose professionals who do not believe that informed consent
is essential before HIV serotesting are risking many difficulties for
their patients, and perhaps also medicolegal hazards for
themselves."

220

The following principle should guide action whether judicial
or legislative: No HIV test should be ordered until physicians understand
the appropriateuse of and potential adverse consequences of the HIV-antibody tests, have provided complete counseling to their patients and have
obtained the patient's written informed consent to the test.
This principle strikes a balance between valuable uses of such
test results and the downside risks. A non-mandatory system,
based on the physician-patient relationship, would offer a less re22 1
strictive alternative to compulsory screening in any form. ' Voluntary screening may better serve the interest in protecting
healthy people from becoming infected. Such testing of a counseled, consenting subject provides a way to "protect uninfected
persons who want to know their HIV status, to improve their; own
health, and to avoid harming others."2 2 2 People are entitled to
discover and control the boundaries of their own secrets, subject
only to persuasion as to careful discovery and disclosure of those
secrets, and' should not be deceived by health care workers in
whom they have placed their trust.
ERS, ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY: A SOCIAL WORK RESPONSE, Nov. 1987 (in
AIDS REFERENCE GUIDE, § 902, p. 1, 2), which states: "Therefore, routine practices to prevent occupational infections should be formulated with the idea that
all patients have the potential to transmit infection .... Strict adherence to recommended infection-control guidelines for dental professionals should help to
minimize the risk of occupationally acquired HIV infection."
220. Searle, supra note 91, at 28. In Searle's words:
In view of the fragile nature of the virus outside the body, the large
volume of evidence indicating an extremely low risk of transmission in
the hospital, the certainty of not being able to identify which patients
are in high-risk groups, and the danger of forcing homosexuals to seek
help elsewhere, it seems most appropriate to adopt hepatitis-B-level
precautions in all situations involving possible contact with body fluids
that may contain virus.
Id.
221. Even in the prison setting, where constitutional rights of prisoners are
limited, courts have searched for alternatives to accommodate prisoner rights at
de minimis cost to state interests. Privacy rights are entitled to weight even in that
circumscribed setting. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). See also Capron,
supra note 92, at 182.
222. Capron, supra note 92, at 183.
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